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We study empirically how past exposure to conflict in origin coun-
tries makes migrants more  violence-prone in their host country, 
focusing on asylum seekers in Switzerland. We exploit a novel 
and unique dataset on all crimes reported in Switzerland by the 
nationalities of perpetrators and of victims over 2009–2016. Our 
baseline result is that cohorts exposed to civil conflict/mass kill-
ing during childhood are 35 percent more prone to violent crime 
than the average cohort. This effect is particularly strong for early 
childhood exposure and is mostly confined to  co-nationals, con-
sistent with  inter-group hostility persisting over time. We exploit 
 cross-region heterogeneity in public policies within Switzerland to 
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document which integration policies are best able to mitigate the 
detrimental effect of past conflict exposure on violent criminality. 
We find that offering labor market access to asylum seekers elimi-
nates  two-thirds of the effect. (JEL D74, F22, K42, Z18)
Political violence is often persistent and wars tend to recur.1 Moreover, there 
is much anecdotal evidence that exposure to conflict makes individuals more 
 violence-prone.2 Various mechanisms explain why people tend to reproduce vio-
lence when they are haunted by having either perpetrated or witnessed violence 
in the past: psychological trauma, a collapse of trust and moral values, economic 
deprivation, to name a few. Yet beyond case studies and anecdotes, the identification 
of a causal impact of past exposure to conflict on future proneness to violence and 
unlawful behavior has proved challenging. This is primarily due to the fact that in 
most cases, people remain in the same environment that caused war to break out in 
the first place, making it hard to isolate the individual effects of war exposure from 
the impact of their surroundings (e.g., weak institutions, natural resource abundance, 
or ethnic cleavages). This lack of systematic  large-scale evidence is worrying, as the 
persistence of violence and crime, and the vicious cycles leading to the recurrence 
of war are key issues in development economics, and are of foremost importance for 
 post-conflict reconstruction.3
In this paper we analyze empirically whether past exposure to conflict in origin 
countries makes migrants more  violence-prone in their host country, focusing on 
asylum seekers in Switzerland. The study of crimes committed by migrants is, of 
course, subject to its own methodological challenges, as a higher crime propensity 
of migrants with past conflict exposure could be driven by various confounding fac-
tors. First, the context of the destination country (here, Switzerland) could bias the 
results due to a spatial sorting of  crime-prone individuals, who may  self-select into 
 crime-facilitating environments (e.g., deprived areas with restricted social networks 
and low labor market opportunities). Second, it is necessary to contend with the 
issue of the selection into migration of particular groups (e.g.,  over-representation 
of genocide perpetrators among migrants). Third,  pre-conflict  slow-moving charac-
teristics of the home country could  codetermine  crime-proneness and war outbreak 
(e.g., poverty, culture of violence, low social capital).
1 Civil conflicts are persistent: 68 percent of all war outbreaks took place in countries where multiple conflicts 
were recorded (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). DeRouen and Bercovitch (2008) documents that more than three-quar-
ters of all civil wars stem from enduring rivalries. Many studies find that past wars are strong predictors of future 
wars (see, e.g., Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009; Besley and  Reynal-Querol 2014).
2 In the popular press, there are numerous  well-publicized cases of people with war experience who after leaving 
the battlefield are convicted of serious crimes. The amplitude of the phenomenon is such that even the prestigious 
daily The New York Times put together the series “War Torn,” (2008) which includes “a series of articles and multi-
media about veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan who have committed killings, or been charged with them, 
after coming home.” The series is available at: https://archive.nytimes.com/query.nytimes.com/gst/ fullpage-9F0CE
0D91E31F93BA35754C0A96E9C8B63.html.
3 The relative scarcity of studies on violence reproduction using regional/ country-level variation contrasts with 
the existence of a number of  micro-level studies using  individual-level data and exploiting differences in individual- 
or village-level conflict exposure, such as, e.g., Bellows and Miguel (2009); Blattman (2009); Voors et al. (2012); 
Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii (2014); Bauer et al. (2014).
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Several institutional features make Switzerland an ideal laboratory to tackle these 
methodological issues. In particular, we make use of an original and exhaustive 
dataset on violent crimes in Switzerland over the  2009–2016 period that has the 
crucial feature of documenting the nationalities of perpetrators. We combine this 
information with a new and  fine-grained dataset on all asylum seekers living in 
Switzerland during the same period and estimate a crime regression at the cohort 
level. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity thanks to a battery of fixed effects 
(i.e., age, nationality × year), our main source of identification corresponds to 
variations in  crime-propensities across cohorts of the same nationality and migra-
tion wave, with differing exposure to civil conflicts and mass killings (i.e., born 
before/after conflict). We also exploit the fact that asylum seekers are exogenously 
assigned to (and required to reside in) one of the 26 Swiss administrative regions 
(i.e., cantons) following a distribution key that allocates quotas based on canton 
population size only and not on migrant characteristics. While this does not prevent 
asylum seekers from spending more time in particular areas within cantons (which 
are already relatively small units), it does rule out  self-selection of asylum seekers 
into more  crime-prone cantons, as well as helps to account for potential differences 
between cantons in terms of policies or crime detection (the main unit for many 
decisions on policies and criminal policing is the canton). For the sake of interpre-
tation, it is also important to rule out  self-selection into conflict exposure. To this 
regard, our data allow us to isolate one group who were not perpetrators: cohorts 
who were children in wartime. While inheritable traits or norms could potentially be 
transmitted by perpetrators to their children, youth born after the war (the reference 
category) or before the end of war are likely to be affected to a similar extent by such 
inheritable traits and norms transmitted over generations.
Our baseline result is that adult male asylum seekers exposed to civil conflict/mass 
killing during childhood (below the age of 12) are 35 percent more prone to violent 
crime than the average cohort of asylum seekers. This effect is particularly strong 
for early childhood exposure; is stable through the life cycle; is present for both civil 
conflict and mass killing exposure; and is not detected (i) for women, (ii) for prop-
erty crimes, or (iii) for conflicts of low severity. Our findings are robust to alternative 
estimation techniques, disaggregation levels, and coding options of exposure during 
childhood.
The crime effect of past conflict exposure that we detect at the cohort level encom-
passes, among others, direct and indirect forms of victimization at the individual 
level, such as being personally targeted by acts of violence (e.g., being injured or 
witnessing the killing of a family member), being exposed to a war context char-
acterized by economic deprivation or social capital depletion (e.g., growing up in 
poverty or in a place marked by the collapse of moral values), suffering from expo-
sure to a  conflict-related erosion of state capacity and the rule of law (e.g., spending 
one’s childhood in the absence of democratic institutions or human rights protec-
tion), or experiencing school closures as a result of conflict (e.g., accumulating less 
human capital during childhood and thus having worse job perspectives later in 
life).4  Conflict-induced compositional effects at the  population level may also drive 
4 Disentangling direct versus indirect victimization is not easy. While  conflict-induced fatalities and injuries 
are by any standards substantial (Wagner et al. 2018), displaced populations have also often directly witnessed 
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part of the results (e.g., only the physically strongest or most aggressive may survive 
the war and migrate). Our baseline analysis does not discriminate against any of the 
channels above as we believe them all to be potentially important and part of the 
effect we are interested in here. Indeed, from the perspective of a receiver country, 
but also within a  post-war reconstruction context, all these possible facets of the 
violent legacy of victimization are highly  policy-relevant.
Data availability constrains our ability to disentangle these channels. In partic-
ular, information on individual and family characteristics is limited. Without data 
on asylum seekers’ precise region of origin within their country, we must rely on a 
relatively coarse measure of conflict exposure at the  country level. To further refine 
the analysis and restrict the array of potential channels, we consequently exploit 
information on the nationalities of both perpetrators and victims. We estimate a 
bilateral crime regression that documents the propensity of cohorts of a given 
nationality to target victims from specific nationalities. Crucially, this allows for the 
inclusion of cohort fixed effects, resulting in our inference being based purely on 
bilateral characteristics, an approach grounded in the gravity trade literature. With 
all  cohort-specific unobserved heterogeneity being  filtered-out, most of the channels 
described above are muted. The bilateral results show that past conflict exposure 
makes asylum seekers more  crime-prone, in general, toward Swiss natives, with a 
violent crime premium close to that of the baseline (41 percent). More importantly, 
we find that this premium is almost tripled in the case of violent crimes targeting 
 co-nationals (114 percent), showing that the increase in the propensity for violent 
crime among individuals exposed to conflict during (early) childhood is mostly con-
fined to their own communities. This finding is consistent, among others, with theo-
ries of civil war recurrence, which stress persistence in the destruction of social ties 
and in  intra-national hostility.
Finally, we exploit the fact that Switzerland is a federal state with large variations 
in institutions and public policies across its 26 cantons. We are particularly inter-
ested in whether there exists a set of integration policies that can mitigate the risk 
of increased criminality for  conflict-exposed individuals. Our main finding is that 
fostering prospects for the labor market integration of asylum seekers can reduce 
the effect of conflict exposure by two-thirds. More specifically, the opportunity to 
apply rapidly for jobs in all sectors together with the promotion of labor market 
access mitigate the crime-inducing impact of conflict exposure. We also find that 
social integration measures such as civic education courses help to protect against 
the risk of conflict exposure, lessening future crime propensity. Due to the absence 
of a randomization scheme in the implementation of policies at the  canton level, our 
exercise relative to policy evaluation cannot go much beyond correlations. Thus, 
while our findings are consistent with the local environment having a causal impact, 
the data do not allow us to rule out all potential confounders. While limited, this 
preliminary evidence is, to the best of our knowledge, new to the literature and fills 
an important gap by documenting how public policies can tackle the recurrence of 
violence in the aftermath of conflict.
violence, lost a family member, or experienced malnutrition (see, for example, de Jong et al. 2002, for Sri Lanka, 
or The Guardian, February 11, 2016, “Report on Syria Conflict Finds 11.5% of Population Killed or Injured”).
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An alternative way to study the role of economic and social integration is to 
focus on the larger sample of economic migrants in Switzerland (roughly  one-fifth 
of the total population). As discussed below, this group has better  long-run prospects 
and higher employment rates than asylum seekers, and we expect these features to 
translate into a lower impact of conflict exposure during childhood on future vio-
lent crime propensity. Our estimations on the sample of economic migrants confirm 
that conflict exposure during childhood increases future violent crime proneness, a 
reassuring result with respect to the external validity of our study. But, as expected, 
the magnitude of the effect is smaller in comparison to our estimates based on the 
sample of asylum seekers (17 percent versus 35 percent).
Taken together, our results are consistent with the notion that the destruction of 
social ties resulting from conflict may matter for future violence, in line with our 
evidence on  intra-national hostility, but that in addition to societal factors, material 
incentives also play a major role. Indeed, both social and economic elements affect 
the  cost-benefit calculations of prospective criminals: while lower social ties reduce 
the costs of attacking  co-nationals, better economic options raise them again. Both 
our suggestive evidence on policies and the results relative to economic migrants 
indicate that even when conflict has torn apart social ties, economic prospects and 
job opportunities can foster resilience.
Besides its academic interest, the question of what factors might make immi-
grants more crime-prone is of great societal importance. In many developed Western 
countries, this topic has fueled heated and  politically-loaded debates, triggering the 
rise of populist parties. To this regard, one policy-relevant conclusion of our paper 
is that the crime risk of asylum seekers with conflict backgrounds can be strongly 
reduced by implementing public policies that facilitate finding employment and thus 
incentivize  law-abiding behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the related 
literature, while Section II describes the data. Section III explains our identification 
strategy and Section IV presents our baseline results, as well as a battery of robust-
ness checks. Bilateral crime regressions documenting violence toward specific 
nationalities are studied in Section V. Section VI analyzes the role of public poli-
cies and Section VII applies the analysis to the larger group of economic migrants. 
Finally, Section VIII concludes.
I. Literature Review
Since the pioneering work of Becker (1968), the literature on the economics of 
crime has examined various drivers of criminal behavior,5 yet the nexus between 
migration and crime has received relatively little attention. Notable exceptions 
are the work of Bianchi, Buonanno, and Pinotti (2012) on Italy; Bell, Fasani, and 
Machin (2013) on the United Kingdom; and Butcher and Piehl (1998) on the United 
States. However, in these countries migrants are able to  self-select their location, 
and the available data are much less  fine-grained than in Switzerland.
5 Prominent topics include the role of poverty and police activity (Levitt 1997 and Kelly 2000), unemployment 
and recessions (Fougère, Kramarz, and Pouget 2009), mineral discoveries (Couttenier, Grosjean, and Sangnier 
2017), and urbanization (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999).
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Recent years have seen a growing literature on the effect of war experience. 
Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013a), for example, builds a model of vicious 
cycles of war experience resulting in low  inter-group trust, and in turn, a higher like-
lihood of future violence. Empirically, the impact of conflict on education and health 
has been found to be unequivocally detrimental, yet its effect on collective action 
and trust remains an open question (see the survey by Bauer et al. 2016).6 While 
several  micro-level studies find positive effects of war exposure on ( within-group) 
cooperation and social behavior at the local level (see Bauer et al. 2016), other 
research finds  between-group hostility in the aftermath of conflict (e.g., Rohner, 
Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2013b). These contrasting findings can be reconciled by the 
view that the experience of conflict elevates “parochial altruistic” motivation (i.e., 
cooperation with  in-group members and hostility toward  out-group members), in 
line with Choi and Bowles (2007) and Cacault et al. (2015). In contrast, however, 
to previous studies that highlight the positive side of parochialism (i.e., altruism 
toward people from the same communities/villages having faced a similar threat), 
these authors emphasize a potentially darker side of parochial behavior (i.e., hostil-
ity toward the antagonistic group).
Of particular relevance as well is the literature on the persistence of violence. 
Miguel, Saiegh, and Satyanath (2011), for example, finds a strong positive relation-
ship between the extent of civil conflict in a soccer player’s home country and his 
propensity to behave violently on the field. Grosjean (2014) studies the persistence 
of a “culture of honor” (enforcing violent vendetta) “imported” into the United 
States by migrants, while Fisman and Miguel (2007) shows the persistence of social 
norms on corruption using data on the parking tickets of diplomats. A recent study 
by Blattman and Annan (2016) experimentally shows for Liberian  ex-fighters that 
the persistence of violence can be attenuated by economic opportunities.
Various studies have examined the impact of exposure to different kinds of events 
during childhood. The psychology literature finds a particular vulnerability to war 
trauma for children between the ages of 5 and 9 ( Kuterovac-Jagodic´ 2003; Barenbaum, 
Ruchkin, and  Schwab-Stone 2004), while economists Giuliano and Spilimbergo 
(2014) detect a persistent effect of having experienced a recession in one’s youth 
on individual beliefs and political preferences. In contrast, other research highlights 
the importance of high-quality early childhood interventions (e.g., Heckman, Pinto, 
and Savelyev 2013). Along these lines, Gould, Lavy, and Paserman (2011) identifies 
a beneficial impact of a “modern environment” during early childhood ( 0–5 years 
of age) on various  socio-economic outcomes later in life. Conversely, Damm and 
Dustmann (2014) finds that the share of young criminals in a given neighborhood 
increases the probability of a young man committing a crime later in life. There is 
also experimental evidence that the formation of  pro-social preferences, particularly 
those related to altruism, egalitarianism, meritocracy, and envy, is very active before 
the age of 12, especially between 6 and 12 (Almås et al. 2010; Bauer, Chytilová, and 
6  See, for example, recent papers studying the effect of war exposure on educational attainment (Blattman and 
Annan 2010, Shemyakina 2011), on mental health (Barenbaum, Ruchkin, and  Schwab-Stone 2004; Derluyn et al. 
2004), on political beliefs and participation and local collective action (Bellows and Miguel 2009, Blattman 2009, 
Humphreys and Weinstein 2007), and on trust and social capital (Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein 2009; Voors et 
al. 2012; Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt 2013; Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2013b; Besley and  Reynal-Querol 2014; 
Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014).
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Pertold-Gebicka 2014; Bauer, Fiala, and Levely 2018; Fehr, Bernhard, and Rockenbach 
2008; Fehr, Glätzle-Rützler, and Sutter 2013). Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt (2013) 
and Bellows and Miguel (2009) find a strong impact on preferences for conflict 
exposure in, respectively, the first 14 and 15 years of life.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on the economics of immigration 
(cf. Borjas 2003, Card 2001, Damm and Dustmann 2014) and work exploiting the 
exogenous allocation of migrants to study labor market outcomes (Edin, Fredriksson, 
and Åslund 2003; Beaman 2012; Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Lawrence 2016).
Our paper is novel with respect to the literature above in several ways. First, it is, 
to the best of our knowledge, the only paper that studies the effect of conflict expo-
sure on crime later in life. Second, we employ  fine-grained data on the nationalities 
of perpetrators and victims to document the persistence of  intra-national hostility. 
Third, the federalist organization and institutional heterogeneity of Switzerland 
allows us to study the impact of public policies on the persistence of violence.
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Switzerland is a federal state with 26 cantons (the main  subnational entities), 
with a population of about 8 million people, and a strong humanitarian tradition. 
According to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, in 2016 about 25 percent of the 
population were foreign nationals. The number of asylum seekers defined as indi-
viduals who have applied and are waiting for approval of refugee status is consider-
ably smaller: over the  2009–2016 period the yearly average of asylum seekers was 
around 34,300 individuals, corresponding to about 0.4 percent of the Swiss popula-
tion. Most of these individuals originate from countries that have experienced war, 
genocide, political instability, and autocracy. The Swiss federal administration sets 
stringent conditions for obtaining political asylum. In particular, individuals must 
demonstrate that a return to their home country would endanger their lives, and 
economic deprivation cannot be the official reason for the request. As a result, on 
average only 10 percent of applicants are granted asylum (B permit), while around 
20 percent are awarded temporary protection (F permit). The processing time for 
asylum requests varies with the number of submissions, but was approximately 
249 days in 2016 according to the State Secretariat of Migration Annual Report. 
Online Appendix A2 provides more details on the admission procedure.
Our sample consists of asylum seekers only, observed during their request for 
asylum. This is a relatively homogeneous population with similar incentives and 
characteristics. We deliberately avoid comparing the criminality of asylum seekers 
with that of native residents, as this could be driven by unobserved heterogeneity 
and detection policies biased toward specific groups. In fact, the identifying varia-
tion we use is the comparison of violent crime propensities across asylum seekers 
with past exposure to conflict versus those without exposure.
A. Data on Asylum Seekers and Economic Migrants
The Swiss State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) provided us with  non-publicly 
available  individual-level administrative data for all asylum seekers and economic 
migrants arriving in Switzerland from 1992 onward. We use the SEM information 
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from  2009–2016, as crime data are only available for this period. For each individ-
ual, we know their beginning and end of stay, location, nationality, age, gender, and 
residence status (i.e., type of permit held).7
B. Data on Past Exposure to Conflict
We use information on different forms of past exposure to conflict to construct 
our main explanatory variables. For exposure to civil conflict, we retrieve informa-
tion from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP 2017), which is by far the 
most widely used data on civil conflict. We include all civil conflicts reaching the 
UCDP/PRIO’s threshold of at least 25  battle-related fatalities. For exposure to mass 
killings, we rely on a dataset on mass killings collected by the Political Instability 
Task Force (PITF 2016), where mass killings are defined as events that “involve the 
promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing 
elites or their agents or in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities 
that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized 
 non-communal group.” 8 Note that exposure to a mass killing of civilians is a very 
different type of violence than that to civil war. We code an event as civil war only 
when the fighting is  two-sided and  battle-related casualties are sizable for all con-
flict parties. In contrast, mass killings of civilians are  one-sided, where the latter are 
helpless victims, and the killings not necessarily related to battles. Hence, in many 
cases, mass killings take the form of purges by the state against civilians rather than 
armed conflict between the state and armed rebels.
Our individual data on asylum seekers do not report information on exposure to 
violence during conflict at the  individual level. We consequently measure past con-
flict exposure at the  cohort level. Our baseline measure is kid [1–12], a binary variable 
that codes for cohorts aged 1 to 12 when the civil conflict or mass killing occurred 
in their origin country. Note that this cohort effect encompasses direct and indirect 
forms of exposure to conflict that are not possible to disentangle, such as being per-
sonally targeted by the act of violence (e.g., being injured or witnessing the killing 
of a family member), or being exposed to a context of war where economic depri-
vation and social capital depletion prevail. We focus on the first 12 years of life, in 
line with substantial evidence that many preferences and attitudes are formed during 
this period of time.9 Moreover, beyond its intrinsic interest, a focus on exposure to 
7 There are various kinds of Swiss residence permits. For EU/EFTA citizens, there is the L EU/EFTA permit 
( short-term residents), the B EU/EFTA permit (resident foreign nationals with a valid employment contract; permit 
is issued for 5 years, renewable), the C EU/EFTA permit (settled foreign nationals who have been in Switzerland 
for at least 5 years; the holder’s right to settle in Switzerland is not subject to any time restrictions or conditions), 
and the G EU/EFTA permit ( cross-border commuters). For non EU/EFTA citizens there are analogous B, C, and G 
permits, as well as a Permit F (former asylum seekers who have been granted temporary protection), and a Permit 
N (asylum seekers). The law also foresees a  so-called Permit S (for former asylum seekers who have been granted 
refugee status), but it has thus far hardly ever been used in practice, with asylum seekers obtaining permanent 
protection being awarded the B permit instead (Hofmann, Buchmann, and Trummer 2014, p. 23). For more infor-
mation, see https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/themen/aufenthalt.html.
8 By this definition, episodes of mass killing have taken place in 28 different countries over the last 50 years, 
and include all of the most notorious historical instances of  large-scale massacres such as, for example, those that 
occurred in Sudan, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Cambodia.
9 See, for instance,  Kuterovac-Jagodic´ (2003); Barenbaum, Ruchkin, and  Schwab-Stone (2004); Fehr, Bernhard, 
and Rockenbach (2008); Almås et al. (2010); Fehr, Glätzle-Rützler, and Sutter (2013); Bauer et al. (2014); Bauer, 
Fiala, and Levely (2018).
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violence during childhood alleviates endogeneity issues due to  self-selection into 
violence (e.g., excluding former perpetrators, see Section III). Finally, in some spec-
ifications, we split our variable of exposure into two categories, kid [ 1–12] (only CC) 
and kid [ 1–12] (only MK), which correspond respectively to exposure to civil con-
flict or mass killing.
C. Crime Data
The Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) provided us with  non-publicly avail-
able exhaustive data on all crimes detected by the police in Switzerland between 
2009 and 2016. This  individual-level dataset was collected by local police services 
and covers all cases where a person was charged with infraction to the Swiss Penal 
Code. Remarkably, the data include precise information on the nationalities and res-
idency status of both the victims and perpetrators of any detected crime, as well as 
on the place, time, and type of the crime. As we are interested in the perpetuation of 
violence, our main explanatory variable is a measure of violent crimes perpetrated by 
asylum seekers that encompasses offenses against life and limb (Swiss Penal Code, 
Title 1), felonies and misdemeanors against liberty (Swiss Penal Code, Title 4), and 
offenses against sexual integrity (Swiss Penal Code, Title 5). We also construct a 
measure of property crime that includes thefts, burglaries, robberies, or scams (Swiss 
Penal Code, Title 2). In the baseline analysis, we make no distinction in terms of 
nationality or background of the victims. This makes sense given that, in the data, 
violent asylum seekers target not only other asylum seekers but also the rest of the 
population: 36.65 percent of victims are themselves asylum seekers, 33.13 percent 
are foreign residents, 30.22 percent are natives. However,  intra-asylum seeker vio-
lence is clearly  over-represented and victim targeting is not random. This pattern is 
consequently at the core of the mechanism we investigate in Section V.
Due to the need to protect confidentiality, the FSO does not allow the merg-
ing of individual level crime data with migration data. Given this legal restriction, 
together with the fact that our explanatory variables of past exposure to violence are 
already measured at the  cohort level, we conduct our statistical analysis at the level 
of a cohort of asylum seekers of nationality n, age a, in year t.10 Hence, combin-
ing migration and crime datasets at the  cohort-level, we build our main dependent 
variable, violent crime propensity, labeled  CP n,a,t , which corresponds to the share (scaled in percentage points) of individuals in the cohort who perpetrate at least 
one violent crime in a given year.11 In the same vein, we define the victimization 
rate ( VR n,a,t ) as the share of individuals in the cohort who are victims of at least one 
violent crime during a given year.
Exhaustive information of such high quality is available in Switzerland only for 
the detection data of crimes charged, but not for final convictions by a court. While 
the number of crimes charged is highly correlated with the amount of convic-
tions, there may be discrepancies if, for example, in some cantons or years police 
10 In a previous version of this paper, data were only available until 2012 and age brackets were used instead of age.
11 This definition of a  cohort-specific crime propensity is not affected by recidivism, as we count the number 
of crimes committed by different individuals (i.e., if person A commits two crimes and person B of the same cell 
commits one crime, this results in the same overall crime propensity as when both of them commit one crime each).
4387COUTTENIER ET AL.: THE VIOLENT LEGACY OF CONFLICTVOL. 109 NO. 12
authorities were more active and successful than in others. Such spatial differences 
in the detection probabilities of crime are however, accounted for by the exoge-
nous allocation of asylum seekers across the Swiss territory (or the inclusion of 
 canton × year fixed effects). There may also be a wedge between the crime rates of 
nationals and foreigners if, for example, some police forces were to predominantly 
control  foreign-looking individuals. This would not, however, bias our estimation 
as we restrict ourselves to  within-asylum seeker comparisons and do not compare 
asylum seeker crime rates with those of Swiss citizens.
D. Descriptive Statistics
We begin by describing the sample of asylum seekers. Over the  2009–2016 period 
the yearly average of asylum seekers was around 34,300 individuals. Table 1 dis-
plays some descriptive statistics on their age structure (for economic migrants, see 
Section VII) and lists the top ten countries of origin. As expected, it is not balanced 
in terms of age: 68 percent below the age of 30. Hence, young individuals, who are 
generally known for being the most  violence-prone, are clearly  over-represented 
among asylum seekers. Further, 24 percent of asylum seekers arrive in Switzerland 
with their family. One-half of the sample originates from either Eritrea, Afghanistan, 
Syria, or Sri Lanka.12
After aggregating asylum seekers by nationality n and age a, for each year t, 
this leaves us with our baseline dataset, composed of 13,720 male cohorts and 
9,503 female cohorts (from 107 countries over 8 years and 71 age categories).13 
Table 2 reports the main descriptive statistics. The average cohort is composed of 11 
individuals for males and 6 for women. Around 92 percent of male or female cohorts 
originate from countries that have experienced at least one episode of civil conflict 
or mass killing since 1946: civil conflicts occurred in 77 countries and mass killings 
in 27 countries. These are the nationalities that contribute to the identifying varia-
tions. More specifically, all these places experienced violence in some, but not all, 
years, leading to  within-nationality,  inter-cohort variations in exposure to violence: 
the sample mean of childhood exposure, kid [ 1–12], is equal to 51 percent. Note 
that 46 percent of cohorts arrived in Switzerland in a year when active civil conflict 
was still raging in their home country. Further, 6 percent of cohorts originate from a 
country that is coded as experiencing current  one-sided mass killings. Among the 77 
countries of origin with a history of at least one civil conflict, around 12 years have 
passed on average since the last year of conflict.14 As for the 27 origin countries 
with a history of at least one mass killing episode, 27 years have passed on average 
since the last year of such an event. Note that the chances of being recognized as a 
12 A graphical representation of the age distribution and nationality composition is provided in online 
Appendix A1.
13 Note that asylum seekers who have lived in Switzerland for several calendar years are part of more than one 
observation unit.
14  When weighted by the share of each nationality among the total number of asylum seekers, the average num-
ber of years since the last year of civil conflict is around 7.9 years. As expected, there are larger inflows of asylum 
seekers from countries with active or recent conflict. More specifically, there are, on average, 12.24 (SD = 35.55) 
asylum seekers in cohorts from countries with current conflict, 9.57 (SD = 16.63) in cohorts from countries where 
the last conflict occurred up to 10 years before, and 10.91 (SD = 41.27) asylum seekers in cohorts from countries 
where the last conflict occurred more than 10 years before.
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refugee increase if there is proof of having been personally persecuted, as opposed 
to solely coming from a country currently experiencing civil conflict. The fact that 
asylum seekers come from places with recent conflict increases the accessibility and 
reliability of such testimonies. In online Appendix A1 we provide a full description 
of the various civil conflicts and mass killings for each nationality.
We now turn to  cohort-level (violent) crime propensities. A  well-documented 
pattern in the crime literature is the fact that only a negligible part of violence is per-
petrated by women (Freeman 1999). This gender imbalance is also true for asylum 
seekers: average violent crime propensity amounts to 3.09 percent for males and 
0.30 percent for females. Consequently, most of our empirical investigation is con-
ducted on the sample of men (the entire analysis is replicated for women in online 
Appendix A6.4).
Figure 1 explores the  age-crime nexus by reporting average propensity by age for 
the two groups of cohorts at the core of our identification strategy: cohorts exposed to 
civil conflict or mass killing during childhood (in black) and those born afterward (in 
gray).15 For both groups, we see a clear spike in violent crime in early adulthood and 
then a steady decrease across ages. The pattern and magnitude conform to the large 
15 We restrict ourselves to the subsample of cohorts from countries with a conflict or mass killing background 
that were born after war or exposed during their childhood ( kid [ 1–12] = 1 ). For each age, we average  CP n,a,t 
across cohorts and time.
Table 1—Share of Asylum Seekers in Switzerland 
by Age and Top Ten Countries of Origin
Age Class Percent Age Class Percent Country Percent Country Percent
[0–17] 22.99 [45–49] 2.39 Eritrea 21.27 Nigeria 4.32
[18–20] 11.24 [50–54] 1.33 Afghanistan 11.09 Iraq 4.02
[21–24] 15.53 [55–59] 0.79 Syria 10.47 China 3.30
[25–29] 18.33 [60–64] 0.54 Sri Lanka 6.84 Turkey 2.81
[30–34] 13.34 [65–69] 0.28 Somalia 4.44 Serbia 2.62
[35–39] 8.27 [70–79] 0.23
[40–44] 4.69 [80+] 0.04
Note: Data from the State Secretariat of Migration over the 2009–2016 period.
Table 2—Summary Statistics for the Cohorts of Asylum Seekers
Men Women
 
Variable
 
Mean
Standard 
deviation
 
Min.
 
Max.
 
Mean
Standard 
deviation
 
Min.
 
Max.
Cohort size (number of individuals) 11.18 34.88 1 1,251 6.08 15.08 1 265
History of civil conflict or mass killing (%) 91.58 27.77 0 100 91.11 28.46 0 100
History of civil conflict (%) 91.22 28.31 0 100 90.92 28.74 0 100
History of mass killing (%) 41.81 49.33 0 100 53.48 49.88 0 100
kid [1–12] (CC or MK, %) 50.58 49.99 0 100 50.55 49.99 0 100
kid [1–12] (CC, %) 49.13 49.99 0 100 48.68 49.99 0 100
kid [1–12] (MK, %) 17.48 37.98 0 100 21.68 41.21 0 100
Violent crime propensity ( CP n,a,t , %) 3.09 11.34 0 100 0.30 3.69 0 100
Victimization rate ( VR n,a,t , %) 3.39 14.92 0 100 2.61 13.83 0 100
Notes: All summary statistics are based on 13,720 cohorts of males and 9,503 cohorts of females, all at least 18 
years of age. Abbreviations CC and MK refer respectively to civil conflict and mass killing.
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body of evidence on  age-crime curves in the criminology literature for other popu-
lations and periods (see Freeman 1999 for a review on the determinants of criminal 
behavior). The striking and novel point here relates to the crime differential between 
the two groups: cohorts with past exposure to conflict during childhood have sig-
nificantly higher crime propensities than those born after conflict. This discrepancy 
is observed across all age categories; only after the age of 60 do the two curves 
converge on a low level. The average differential is equal to 0.73 percentage points, 
a substantial wedge that implies that cohorts exposed during childhood are on aver-
age 1.75 times more prone to violent crimes than those born after a conflict. This 
graphical evidence illustrates our main result. The econometric analysis that follows 
aims to confirm that this excess crime propensity is in fact related to the exposure 
to violence in childhood, accounting for a variety of potential confounding factors.
III. Identification Strategy
Our source of identification corresponds to variations in  crime-propensities across 
cohorts of asylum seekers from the same nationality and migration wave but with dif-
ferent exposure to conflict (i.e., born after war/exposed in childhood/exposed at later 
ages). Because these cohorts inevitably differ in terms of age, we must control for 
the direct effect of age by comparing them to other cohorts with similar age struc-
ture but with different exposure to conflict in another country. To give an intuitive 
example, our strategy consists of computing the crime differential of two Rwandese 
cohorts, one born in 1996 (after the 1994 genocide), and one born in 1990 (exposed 
during childhood), both migrating to Switzerland in 2015. Their crime differential 
is compared to the one of two Nigerian cohorts of the same ages but both being born 
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Figure 1. Age-Violence Curves
Note: The figure reports the average crime propensity by age for two groups of cohorts: (i) cohorts exposed to civil 
conflict or mass killing during childhood (in black); (ii) cohorts born after a conflict (in gray).
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(in 1990 and 1996) after the  1967–1970 civil war. Our comparison of the black/gray 
 crime-age curves in Figure 1 follows the same logic.
More formally, our unit of observation is a cohort, and our baseline crime regres-
sion corresponds to16
(1)  CP n,a,t = α ×  kid [1–12] n,a,t 
 +  ∑ 
k=13
 
80+
β (k) × expo (k) n,a,t +  FE n,t +  FE a +  ε n,a,t ,
where  CP n,a,t stands for the violent crime propensity of a cohort of nationality (n) 
and age (a) living in Switzerland in year (t). Note the absence of a subscript for 
gender in the previous specification, the reason being that, throughout the paper, 
all specifications are estimated separately on the subsamples of men and women. 
As discussed above, our main explanatory variable is  kid [1–12] n,a,t , a binary mea-
sure of early age exposure. The set of control variables  expo  (k) n,a,t are also binary 
variables coding for past exposure, but at the later ages  k .17 Crucially, the richness 
of our dataset allows for the inclusion of fixed effects that account for unobserved 
heterogeneity in nationality × year ( FE n,t ) and in age ( FE a ). Hence, the identifying 
variations come from all nationalities with substantial  cross-cohort heterogeneity in 
past exposure such that the exposure dummies,  kid [ 1–12] n,a,t and  expo  (k) n,a,t , are not 
collinear with the nationality fixed effect  FE n,t . Finally, robust standard errors are 
clustered at the nationality level.
In equation (1), the implicit reference group consists of cohorts born after a con-
flict (such that all the exposure dummies are equal to zero). Thus, our parameter of 
interest  α can be interpreted as the crime differential between cohorts exposed during 
their childhood and cohorts born after the conflict. Our identifying assumption is that 
past exposure to conflict is the only reason why there is less decline in crime rates 
with age for asylum seekers exposed in childhood than for their  co-nationals born 
after the conflict.18 A threat to our identification strategy would be that  post-war 
contexts are systematically associated with a flattening of the  age-crime curve for 
16 The decision of whether to perpetrate a crime is, however, made at the individual level. A specification based 
on  microdata would have the individual as unit of observation and would estimate a  random-utility  discrete-choice 
model, such as, e.g., a binomial logit. For samples based on grouped data, like ours, Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers 
(2010) shows that the logit model translates into a linear specification where the dependent variable is the log of 
the odds ratio of the crime propensity. They recommend implementing this aggregate logit procedure only when 
the  aggregation level is sufficiently high such that sampling errors are limited and  group-level crime frequencies 
approximate well the underlying crime probabilities. In our context, the average cohort size is not large (i.e., 11 
individuals) and, more importantly, the variance is large with many small cohorts: those with 5 individuals or less 
represent 68 percent of the sample. Hence, sampling errors become a salient issue and, together with the fact that 
crime is a rare event, implies that the number of zeros is very large ( CP n,a,t = 0 for 83.6 percent of cohorts), mak-
ing the computation of an odds ratio problematic. We consequently prefer a baseline specification that is compatible 
with extreme values in  CP n,a,t by estimating a linear crime regression with  CP n,a,t as dependent variable. This choice 
follows the standard practice in the crime literature (see, e.g., Bell, Fasani, and Machin 2013). Finally, we investi-
gate in robustness analyses alternative options and econometric specifications for dealing with small cohorts and 
extreme values (online Appendix A5).
17 We code  expo  (k) n,a,t = 1 for cohorts who were  k years old when civil conflict or mass killings occurred in 
their origin country. A cohort could be exposed during different periods of life. Cohorts born after the last year of 
conflict in their origin country are considered as born after. The last year of conflict is defined as the last year of 
conflict over all the years of conflict in a country.
18 We thank Christian Dustmann and Erzo Luttmer for their comments and suggestions on this point.
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all cohorts. In this respect, a reassuring fact is the robustness of our results when 
the estimation sample is restricted to nationalities with a recent history of conflict 
(columns 2 to 4 in the baseline Table 5, panel A). In this case, all  in-sample cohorts 
have been exposed to a conflict or to a  post-conflict context.
Another encouraging pattern is the observation in column 2 of Table 14 of a sharp 
decrease in crime propensity between cohorts born during conflicts and those born 
just after.
A. Exogenous Spatial Allocation of Asylum Seekers in Switzerland
The potential concern about  self-selection into a  crime-facilitating canton is 
addressed by the exogenous allocation of asylum seekers on the part of the Swiss 
authorities.19 In what follows, we provide a brief overview of this process of allo-
cation as well as discuss statistical evidence supporting the view that the distri-
bution key is based on canton population size only and is exogenous to migrant 
characteristics.
Overview of the Allocation Process: Most asylum seekers enter Switzerland 
through one of the borders near which the national reception and procedure centers 
(RPC) are located with the purpose of applying for asylum. In the RPC, asylum 
seekers are interviewed, and asked to provide proof of identity, fingerprints, and 
their reasons for application. After this initial selection, only the  so-called “cred-
ible” asylum seekers are granted a temporary N permit by the Swiss authorities. 
Given the difficulty in assessing the threat of persecution in the home country and 
the large number of applicants (around 34,300 per year over the  2009–2016 period), 
the asylum process takes substantial time. The average duration of the process was 
249 days in 2016 according to the State Secretariat of Migration report (for further 
details on the asylum process, see online Appendix A2).
Crucially, during this period, holders of the N permit are exogenously allocated 
to cantons and are not allowed to change canton.20 The allocation of new N permit 
holders to the 26 Swiss cantons is determined by an exogenous allocation key based 
on the cantonal population. This approach was introduced with an amendment to 
the Aliens Law in 1988, presumably to minimize  self-segregation and ghetto effects 
and avoid social tension between natives and asylum seekers. The State Secretariat 
of Migration (SEM) assigns the canton and the decision cannot be appealed with 
the exception of very specific conditions (i.e., if a minor was allocated to a different 
canton than her parents or if the asylum seeker or a third person were under serious 
threat) and any change is only possible with the approval of both cantons. According 
19 While this exogenous allocation to cantons rules out  self-selection of asylum seekers into more  crime-prone 
cantons, it does not, of course, exclude that asylum seekers may choose to spend greater amounts of time in more 
 crime-prone areas within a given canton. However, given that Swiss cantons are relatively small units and that many 
crucial policies are implemented at the canton level, the exogenous allocation across cantons is arguably of crucial 
importance.
20 This exogenous allocation is described in official documents, such as in Chapter F6 of the State Secretary of 
Migration’s Handbook of Asylum and Return (2015), which describes “random allocation” (Zufallsprinzip). This 
system is also exploited by Hainmueller, Hangartner , and Lawrence (2016, p. 2) which similarly states that “During 
their waiting period, asylum seekers are housed in accommodations in a randomly assigned Swiss canton and they 
are not allowed to leave this canton.”
4392 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2019
to Hofmann, Buchmann, and Rummer (2014), it is extremely rare that asylum seek-
ers change canton or cantons refuse asylum seekers. Once an asylum seeker has 
been allocated to a given canton, the latter organizes accommodation in a cantonal 
center or individual flat and is responsible for interviews and financial matters.
Balancing Tests: We now address the question of whether there is indeed exoge-
nous allocation of asylum seekers through the official  population-based distribution 
key, as the Federal administration claims, or if there remains some selection on 
relevant dimensions. For example, such selective allocation could occur if, say, the 
urban (and supposedly more  crime-prone) cantons of Zürich or Geneva were more 
likely to host young males fleeing a conflict zone, while rural and quieter cantons 
were to host other asylum seekers. We consequently estimate whether the place-
ment of asylum seekers is overall uncorrelated with canton characteristics. Table 3 
displays a series of unconditional and conditional balancing tests which compare 
characteristics of the canton of residence between the  conflict-exposed cohorts at 
early ages ( kid [1–12] = 1 ) and the other cohorts ( kid [1–12] = 0 ). The regression 
equation is given by
(2)   canton c,t = α ×  kid [1–12] n,a,t 
 +  ∑ 
k=13
 
80+
β (k) × expo (k) n,a,t +  FE n,t +  FE a +  FE g +  ε n,a,g,c,t ,
where the unit of observation is a cohort of nationality (n) × age (a) and gender (g) 
living in canton (c) in year (t). The previous equation is estimated on our baseline 
sample of adult asylum seekers originating from countries that have experienced 
civil conflict or mass killing since 1946, disaggregated at the canton level. For the 
sake of space, we report only the results for the pooled sample (i.e., with male 
and female cohorts); (unreported) results are similar when balancing tests are con-
ducted separately on the two  subsamples. The set of covariates  kid [1–12] n,a,t and 
expo  (k) n,a,t , and the fixed effects  FE n,t ,  FE a are identical to those included in our 
baseline econometric equation (1);  FE g is a gender fixed effect. The outcome vari-
able  canton c,t corresponds to an observable characteristic of the canton  c in year  t 
to which the cohort has been allocated. The set of cantonal characteristics includes 
the local composition of asylum seekers, the composition of the existing local immi-
grants’ enclave, GDP/cap, total population, and total crime rate (definitions of the 
variables are relegated to the table note).
Each entry in the table corresponds to an estimation for a given characteristic. 
Columns 1 to 3, 7 to 9, and 13 to 15 display unconditional mean differences and 
columns 4 to 6, 10 to 12, and 16 to 18 report the conditional mean differences when 
the battery of fixed effects is included. In most cases, the mean differences are not 
statistically different from zero (at the conventional thresholds). More importantly, 
they are small in magnitude with respect to both the sample mean and the standard 
deviation of the considered characteristic. We conclude from this exercise that, reas-
suringly, there is no evidence of the placement of asylum seekers along the kid [1–12] 
dummy. We complement this analysis in online Appendix A3 by testing for the dif-
ference in means between cantons for other observable characteristics. All in all, the 
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Table 3—Balancing Tests: Cantonal Placement
Asylum Seekers
Unconditional Conditional
Between
countries
Within
countries
 
Sex ratio
Between
countries
Within
countries
 
Sex ratioDependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
kid [1–12] −1.241 −0.251 0.069 0.039 0.091 −0.183
(1.391) (0.494) (2.953) (0.060) (0.104) (0.104)
[0.374] [0.613] [0.981] [0.513] [0.382] [0.083]
Observations 91,195 91,195 91,195 91,134 91,134 91,134
R2 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.919 0.308 0.690
Sample mean (dep. var.) 6.4 7.45 71.18 6.4 7.45 71.18
(7.37) (7.02) (18.43) (7.37) (7.02) (18.43)
Economic Migrants
Unconditional Conditional
Dependent variable:
Between
countries
Within
countries
 
Sex ratio
Between
countries
Within
countries
 
Sex ratio
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
kid [1–12] −0.377 −0.533 −0.714 0.029 0.287 −0.171
(0.590) (0.548) (2.644) (0.020) (0.105) (0.150)
[0.525] [0.334] [0.788] [0.164] [0.008] [0.261]
Observations 64,325 64,325 64,325 64,283 64,283 64,283
R2 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.716 0.081 0.568
Sample mean (dep. var.) 1.28 7.29 56.2 1.28 7.29 56.2
(2.93) (7.66) (13.47) (2.93) (7.66) (13.47)
Unconditional Conditional
Dependent variable: GDP/cap Population Crime rate GDP/cap Population Crime rate
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
kid [1–12] −0.443 −3.179 −0.187 −0.158 1.770 −0.014
(0.392) (6.104) (0.108) (0.291) (2.631) (0.034)
[0.261] [0.604] [0.087] [0.589] [0.503] [0.685]
Observations 70,544 94,176 94,176 70,498 94,115 94,115
R2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.017 0.088 0.088
Sample mean (dep. var.) 1,121.79 1,282.28 6.44 1,121.79 1,282.28 6.44
(24.73) (92.56) (2.64) (24.73) (92.56) (2.64)
Notes: OLS estimations based on the canton-level sample of adult cohorts of asylum seekers originating from coun-
tries that have experienced civil conflict or mass killing since 1946. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clus-
tered at the nationality level. p-values are reported on brackets. The dependent variable at the cantonal-year level 
is alternatively (i) the number of adult asylum seekers by country of origin × year × canton over the number of 
adult asylum seekers by year × canton (columns 1 and 4); (ii) the number of adult asylum seekers by country of 
origin × year × canton over the number of adult asylum seekers by country × year (columns 2 and 5); (iii) the pro-
portion of male asylum seekers (columns 3 and 6); (iv) the number of adult economic migrants (B&C permits) by 
country of origin × year × canton over the number of adult economic migrants (B&C permits) by year × canton 
(columns 7 and 10); (v) the number of adult economic migrants (B&C permits) by country of origin × year 
× canton over the number of adult economic migrants (B&C permits) by country × year (columns 8 and 11); (vi) 
the proportion of male economic migrants (B&C permits) (columns 9 and 12); (vii) the cantonal GDP/cap (2009–
2014) (columns 13 and 16); (viii) the total permanent population (2009–2016) (columns 14 and 17); (ix) the total 
crime rate (2009–2016) (columns 15 and 18). The sample mean and the standard deviation of the dependent vari-
ables are reported. The explanatory variable is the exposure to civil conflict or mass killing between the ages of 
1 and 12 (kid [1–12]). Country × year, age, and gender fixed effects are included in the conditional estimations, 
namely in columns 4 to 6, 10 to 12, and 16 to 18.
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tests confirm that the characteristics of asylum seeker cohorts are balanced across 
Swiss cantons.
B.  Post-Conflict Exposure and Selection into Migration
As discussed above, our empirical design relies on the assumption that past expo-
sure to conflict is the only reason why there is less decline in crime rates with age 
among asylum seekers exposed to conflict in childhood than for their  co-nationals 
born after. In what follows, we provide supportive evidence of this assumption by 
showing that cohorts exposed to conflict during childhood do not differ substantially 
on a range of  post-exposure characteristics compared to other cohorts. More specifi-
cally, we estimate an equation that is similar to our master econometric equation (1) 
except that the left-hand-side variable is now an observable cohort characteristic. 
The overall sample is also identical to the baseline one, the male and female subsa-
mples being pooled together. The array of cohort characteristics corresponds to: the 
number of asylum seekers per cohort; a dummy equal to 1 if the age of the cohort is 
below the median age of the  co-national cohorts; the percentage of men; the share of 
asylum seekers who arrive with family members; the share of asylum seekers work-
ing in services or offices; the size of the enclave (i.e., number of economic migrants 
with a B or C permit) relative to the cohort size; the number of ethnic groups.21
The results of these balancing tests are displayed in Table 4. Each entry reports 
the estimated coefficient of the variable kid[1–12] for a given cohort characteris-
tic. This coefficient can be interpreted as the mean difference of observable char-
acteristics between early age exposed cohorts ( kid [1–12] = 1 ) and other cohorts 
( kid [1–12] = 0 ). Panel A displays unconditional mean differences and panel B 
reports the conditional mean differences when all the fixed effects are included. 
We see that the mean differences are not statistically different from zero (at con-
ventional thresholds) and are small in magnitude with respect to the sample mean 
and standard deviation of the characteristic. These results support the view that 
there is no differential selection into migration based on childhood exposure. In 
online Appendix A3.2 we reach a similar conclusion when the balancing tests are 
conducted in a multivariate way. We also show that cohorts exposed during child-
hood are not systematically from a different ethnic group than other cohorts. Finally 
our robustness analysis shows that our baseline results on the impact of childhood 
exposure on crime propensity are unchanged when controlling directly for all those 
cohort characteristics in the econometric equation (1) (see online Appendix A5.4).
Finally, in online Appendix A4 we complement this analysis by estimating 
whether there is any  cross-cohort difference in the incentives to apply for asylum in 
Switzerland. Any different perspective for obtaining asylum could drive differences 
in incentives for engaging in crime. The decision to grant or not asylum is deter-
mined by the current level of threat faced by our sample of adult asylum seekers, and 
exposure many years prior, during childhood, is presumed not to affect the decisions 
of the authorities. We test this idea by estimating the  cohort-specific likelihood of 
being granted a residence permit on the kid [1–12] dummy. We find that conflict 
21 Information on the sector of occupation is especially incomplete. Given the available information, we define 
as white collar asylum seekers those working in services or offices, science and arts, or architecture and technology.
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exposure during childhood ( kid [1–12] = 1 ) does not affect the current chances of 
obtaining asylum. By contrast, we find that present institutional quality reduces the 
acceptation rate, while the current outbreak of a civil conflict or mass killings in the 
country of origin increases the acceptation rate; economic development does not 
have any impact.
IV. Conflict Exposure and Violent Crimes Empirical Results
A. Baseline Results
This section establishes our core result, namely that early age exposure to civil 
conflict/mass killing substantially increases the violent crime propensity of adult 
male asylum seekers. Many  policy-relevant channels contribute to this phenome-
non and Section V focuses specifically on the role of  intra-national grievances. We 
do not, however, detect any effect of exposure during childhood for females, for 
 non-violent crimes, or for victimization rates. Consequently, in what remains of the 
paper we focus our analysis on the violent criminal behavior of men.
Violent Crime Propensity: Panel A of Table 5 displays the results of our 
 cohort-level crime regression (equation (1)) estimated on the sample of adult male 
Table 4—Balancing Tests: Cohort-Level Observable Characteristics
Dependent variable
Cohort 
size
Below 
median age
 
Sex ratio
% Have 
family
% White 
collar
Enclave size/
cohort size
# Ethnic
groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Unconditional
kid [1–12] 3.569 0.263 0.036 −0.023 0.008 −9.237 0.346
(2.494) (0.071) (0.025) (0.032) (0.009) (11.231) (0.156)
[0.156] [0.000] [0.146] [0.480] [0.377] [0.413] [0.030]
Observations 21,383 21,383 21,383 20,725 3,744 21,383 17,802
R2 0.004 0.069 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.018
Sample mean 
 (dep. var.)
9.72 0.49 0.67 0.32 0.04 28.18 1.87
(29.72) (0.49) (0.31) (0.39) (0.16) (105.23) (1.26)
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Panel B. Country × year, age, and gender fixed effects
kid [1–12] 0.806 −0.007 0.010 0.018 −0.002 −1.229 0.053
(4.139) (0.029) (0.011) (0.019) (0.011) (4.967) (0.092)
[0.846] [0.821] [0.384] [0.345] [0.892] [0.805] [0.565]
Observations 21,320 21,320 21,320 20,662 3,631 21,320 17,756
R2 0.326 0.773 0.460 0.365 0.136 0.682 0.504
Sample mean 
 (dep. var.)
9.75 0.49 0.67 0.32 0.03 28.1 1.87
(29.76) (0.49) (0.3) (0.39) (0.16) (104.94) (1.27)
Notes: OLS estimations based on the sample of adult cohorts of asylum seekers originating from countries that have 
experienced civil conflict or mass killing since 1946. Robust standard errors are clustered at the nationality level. 
The dependent variable consists of the set of cohort observable characteristics and the explanatory variable is the 
exposure to civil conflict or mass killings between the ages of 1 and 12 (kid [1–12]). The dependent variable is alter-
natively (i) the number of asylum seekers per cohort (columns  1 and  8 ); (ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the age of the 
cohort is below the median age of the co-national cohorts (columns  2 and  9 ); (iii) the percentage of men (columns 3 
and  10 ); (iv) the share of asylum seekers who arrived with family members (columns  4 and  11 ); (v) the share of 
asylum seekers working in services or offices (columns  5 and  12 ); (vi) the ratio between the number of economic 
migrants holding a B or C permit and the number of asylum seekers (columns  6 and  13 ); (vii) the number of ethnic 
groups (columns  7 and  14 ). The sample mean and the standard deviation of the dependent variables are reported.
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asylum seekers (above 18 years old). We report only our coefficient of interest, 
α ˆ , which captures the violent crime  over-propensity of cohorts exposed to civil 
war or mass killing during childhood (1–12 years), the reference group being 
cohorts born after conflict. Column 1 reports the results of a specification with 
age and country × year fixed effects where the identifying variations come from a 
 within-nationality/ between-cohort comparison. The coefficient of interest is posi-
tive and significant at the 5 percent threshold. In column 2 we exclude all cohorts 
originating from countries that have experienced no civil conflict or mass killing 
since 1946 (as discussed in Section III). This is our preferred specification (base-
line). The point estimate barely changes in spite of the sample size reduction. In 
terms of magnitude, we observe that the crime propensity of cohorts exposed during 
childhood is on average 1.1 percentage points higher than the propensity of their 
Table 5—Violent Crime Propensity and Conflict Exposure
Violent crime propensity
Sample: Full CC and MK CC MK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Men
kid [1–12] 1.096 1.085
(0.461) (0.454)
kid [1–12] (only CC) 1.220
(0.478)
kid [1–12] (only MK) 1.167
(0.591)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nationality × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,720 12,564 12,514 5,737
R2 0.193 0.200 0.200 0.196
Sample mean (crime propensity) 3.09 3.09 3.11 2.59
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B. Women
kid [1–12] 0.026 0.033
(0.117) (0.118)
kid [1–12] (only CC) −0.045
(0.129)
kid [1–12] (only MK) 0.275
(0.203)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nationality × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,503 8,658 8,640 5,082
R2 0.092 0.055 0.055 0.063
Sample mean (crime propensity) 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.32
Notes: OLS estimations based on the sample of adult cohorts of asylum seekers. Robust stan-
dard errors are clustered at the nationality level. The dependent variable stands for the violent 
crime propensity of a cohort of nationality (n) × age (a) × year (t). kid [1–12] is a binary mea-
sure of childhood exposure to civil conflict or mass killings (columns 1 to 2), to civil conflict 
only (column 3), or to mass killings only (column 4). In columns 2 to 4, the sample is restricted 
to cohorts originating from countries that have experienced civil conflict or mass killings since 
1946. Panel A is confined to the male adult cohorts and panel B to the female adult cohorts of 
asylum seekers. All estimations include age fixed effects, nationality × year fixed effects and 
a set of binary variables coding for past exposure, but at later ages  k ∈ {13, 14, 15, …, 80+} . 
Therefore, the reference group consists of those individuals born after the last years of vio-
lence. Abbreviations CC and MK refer respectively to civil conflict and mass killing.
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 co-national cohorts born after the war: a substantial effect given that the sample 
mean of violent crime propensity is equal to 3.1 percentage points. Thus, cohorts 
exposed to civil conflict/mass killing during childhood are  35 percent ( = 1.1/3.1 ) 
more prone to violent crime than the average cohort of asylum seekers.22 As a 
benchmark, age has comparable consequences on crime propensity (coefficients 
not reported here): on average, the  20–29-year-old cohorts have a 5.2 percentage 
point higher crime propensity than cohorts older than the age of 50; this drops to 
4.22 percentage points for the  30–39 age bracket and to 1.77 percentage points 
for the  40–49-year-olds. In sum, even if age tends to be a powerful determinant of 
crime, past exposure to conflict in childhood still substantially matters. In columns 
3 and 4 we estimate the same specification as in column 2, but now separately for 
conflict and mass killings. In each case, the sample is again restricted to countries 
having experienced each specific type of violence.
Panel B replicates the previous approach for the sample of adult female asylum 
seekers. The coefficient of interest loses its statistical significance at conventional 
thresholds in all specifications. More importantly, its magnitude drops massively 
with respect to its counterpart for the sample of males, both in absolute and relative 
terms, as the coefficient is reduced by a factor of 30 in the baseline specification 
(i.e., comparing columns 2 and 6) while the sample mean is reduced by a factor 
of 10. This shows that childhood exposure to civil conflict or mass killing does not 
significantly affect the future violent criminal behavior of women.
Types of Crimes: In Table 6, we further document the nature of the crimes 
perpetrated by asylum seekers. To this end, we split our outcome variable of vio-
lent crime propensity into three  subcategories and, for each, estimate our baseline 
specification (Table 5, panel A, column 2) on the sample of adult male asylum 
seekers.23 We consider crimes against life and limb (column 1); felonies and 
misdemeanors against liberty (column 2); and offenses against sexual integrity 
(column 3). Both the magnitude and statistical significance of our coefficient of 
interest are strikingly lower for sexual offenses. This is in line with previous find-
ings that sexual offenses are often explained by other, more idiosyncratic, drivers 
than general criminal and  antisocial behavior (see, for example, the  meta-analysis 
by Seto and Lalumière 2010).24 For comparative purposes, in column 4 we 
consider property crimes, namely a large class of  non-violent crimes, which is 
excluded from our baseline analysis but encompasses thefts, burglaries, robber-
ies, or scams (Swiss Penal Code, Title 2, art. 137 to 172). The coefficient loses 
22 Note that the sample consists of 50.6 percent of observations where  kid [1–12] = 1 , and 49.4 percent of 
observations where  kid [1–12] = 0 . Given that the estimated value of the coefficient of kid[1–12] is equal to 1.1, 
this implies that the counterfactual sample mean would be equal to 2.54 percent if all cohorts had not been exposed 
during childhood (i.e., kid [1–12] switches to 0 for all cohorts). Hence, if we were to ask the (somewhat different) 
accounting question of by how much does conflict exposure during childhood contribute to the observed crime 
propensity in the sample, we would obtain an even larger number, namely 43 percent ( = 1.1/2.54 ).
23 The category “life and limb” (Swiss Penal Code, Title 1, art. 111 to 136) includes murder, homicide, endan-
gering the life of others, and bodily injuries. The category “felonies and misdemeanors against liberty” (Swiss Penal 
Code, Title 4, art. 180 to 186) corresponds to threat, constraint, abduction, and home invasion. The category “sexual 
integrity” (Swiss Penal Code, Title 5, art. 187 to 200) includes rape, sexual constraint, and prostitution.
24 This result for sexual offenses is important as it speaks to controversy recently sparked by events at 
Carnival in Cologne (see New York Times, January 8, 2016, “18 Asylum Seekers Are Tied to Attacks on Women in 
Germany”).
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 statistical  significance at the conventional thresholds and its magnitude relative to 
the sample mean (0.77/5.02) is slightly reduced. This result suggests that expo-
sure to conflict during childhood impacts the future violent behavior of men, but 
leaves their future  non-violent criminality unaffected. We interpret this contrast-
ing evidence as a first indication that our effect captures a mechanism of perpet-
uation of violence, a point we develop in more detail in Section V. From a causal 
analysis perspective, we interpret the absence of an effect for property crime as an 
indication that the correlation between past exposure and violent crime is unlikely 
to be spuriously driven by omitted factors (unless such factors were to affect dif-
ferentially violent crime and property crime). Finally, note that once again, no 
effect is detected for women (panel B).
Victimization Rate: To complement our analysis on criminal behavior, we also 
study adult asylum seekers as victims rather than criminals. As displayed in Table 2, 
on average 3.39 percent of adult male asylum seekers are victims of violent crimes 
Table 6—Crime Propensities and Conflict Exposure by Types of Offenses
Dependent variable: Crime propensity
 
Type of offenses:
Life and 
limb
Against 
liberty
Sexual 
integrity
 
Property
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Men
kid [1–12] 0.592 0.892 0.010 0.773
(0.277) (0.407) (0.062) (0.848)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nationality × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,564 12,564 12,564 12,564
R2 0.112 0.198 0.069 0.396
Sample mean (crime propensity) 1.39 2.34 0.25 5.02
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B. Women
kid [1–12] 0.061 0.015 0.006 −0.224
(0.111) (0.075) (0.012) (0.377)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nationality × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,658 8,658 8,658 8,658
R2 0.053 0.053 0.040 0.114
Sample mean (crime propensity) 0.17 0.17 0.006 1.04
Notes: OLS estimations based on the sample of adult cohorts of asylum seekers originating 
from countries that have experienced civil conflict or mass killings since 1946. Robust stan-
dard errors are clustered at the nationality levels. The dependent variable stands for the crime 
propensity of a cohort of nationality (n) × age (a) × year (t) for the different types of crimes. 
kid [1–12] is a binary measure of childhood exposure to civil conflict or mass killings. Panel A 
is confined to the male adult cohorts and panel B to the female adult cohorts of asylum seekers. 
All estimations include age fixed effects, nationality × year fixed effects and a set of binary 
variables coding for past exposure, but at later ages  k ∈ {13, 14, 15, …, 80+} . Therefore, the 
reference group consists of the individuals born after the last years of violence. The category 
Life and limb (Swiss Penal Code, Title 1, art. 111 to 136) includes murder, homicide, and 
endangering the lives of others, and bodily injuries. The category Felonies and misdemeanors 
against liberty (Swiss Penal Code, Title 4, art. 180 to 186) corresponds to threat, constraint, 
abduction, and home invasion. The category Sexual integrity (Swiss Penal Code, Title 5, art. 
187 to 200) includes rape, sexual constraint, and prostitution. The category Property (Swiss 
Penal Code, Title 2, art. 137 to 172) encompasses thefts, burglaries, robberies, or scams.
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in a given year (2.61 percent of females). We test whether  conflict-related victim-
ization during childhood translates into a higher likelihood of being victimized later 
in life, the rationale put forward in the social psychology literature being that early 
age trauma has a  long-standing effect on personality and vulnerability. To this end, 
we replicate our baseline specifications for men and women respectively (columns 2 
and 6 in Table 5) with the  cohort-level victimization rate as dependent variable (in 
place of crime propensity). Table 7 displays the main results. We focus on victim-
ization related to all violent crimes in columns 1 and 5 and by category of violent 
crime in the other columns. In all specifications, the coefficient of interest is small in 
magnitude (both in absolute and relative terms) and statistically insignificant at the 
conventional thresholds. Hence, we detect no effect of childhood exposure to civil 
conflict and mass killing on future victimization, either for men or women.
Sensitivity Analysis: In online Appendix A5 we show that the baseline estimate of 
Table 5, panel A, column 2 is robust to a battery of sensitivity checks. In particular, 
we investigate robustness to the exclusion of potential outliers (i.e., a specific set of 
Table 7—Victimization Rate
Victimization rate
Dependent variable:
Violent 
crimes
Life and 
limb
Against 
liberty
Sexual 
integrity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Men
kid [1–12] −0.013 −0.261 0.220 −0.004
(0.395) (0.360) (0.202) (0.078)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nationality × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,564 12,564 12,564 12,564
R2 0.083 0.080 0.058 0.044
Sample mean (victimization rate) 3.59 2.67 1.23 0.05
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B. Women
kid [1–12] 0.446 0.369 0.357 −0.066
(0.343) (0.294) (0.234) (0.111)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nationality × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,658 8,658 8,658 8,658
R2 0.084 0.077 0.064 0.061
Sample mean (victimization rate) 2.70 1.62 1.41 0.33
Notes: OLS estimations based on the sample of adult cohorts of asylum seekers originating 
from countries that have experienced civil conflict or mass killing since 1946. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the nationality level. The dependent variable stands for the victimization 
rate of a cohort of nationality (n) × age (a) × year (t) for the different types of crimes. Panel A 
is confined to the male adult cohorts and panel B to the female adult cohorts of asylum seek-
ers. All estimations include age fixed effects and nationality × year fixed effects. The reference 
group consists of those individuals born after the last years of violence. The category Life and 
limb (Swiss Penal Code, Title 1, art. 111 to 136) includes murder, homicide, endangering the 
lives of others, bodily injuries. The category Felonies and misdemeanors against liberty (Swiss 
Penal Code, Title 4, art. 180 to 186) corresponds to threat, constraint, abduction, and home 
invasion. The category Sexual integrity (Swiss Penal Code, Title 5, art. 187 to 200) includes 
rape, sexual constraint, and prostitution. The category Property (Swiss Penal Code, Title 2, art. 
137 to 172) encompasses thefts, burglaries, robberies, or scams.
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nationalities), alternative levels of clustering, alternative sample sizes, and alterna-
tive estimation methods. Further, we display the estimates based on the sample of 
cohorts disaggregated at the  canton level, control for additional  cohort-level cohorts, 
and test the robustness when adding ethnic group fixed effects. We find that our 
results are robust to all these sensitivity tests.
B. Age Effects
In this section, we examine the modulating effect of age on the criminal behavior 
of male asylum seekers. In our context, age matters in two respects: (i) its dampen-
ing effect on crime propensity and (ii) the time of life during which individuals are 
exposed to conflict. While the former is relatively standard in the crime literature, 
the latter is particularly important given our emphasis on conflict exposure during 
childhood. We thus fully investigate how conflict exposure at different ages impacts 
future criminal behaviors. The results confirm the critical role of childhood and, in 
particular, of the first five years of life.
Life-Cycle Modulation and Early Conflict Exposure: In Table 14, we examine 
age effects for male asylum seekers who were exposed to conflict during child-
hood. In column 1, we are interested in life-cycle modulations of the impact of 
past exposure. We interact our main explanatory variable with (mutually exclusive) 
decade dummies coding for the current age of the cohorts. The interaction terms, 
though imprecisely estimated for some age brackets, show a positive impact of past 
exposure on crime propensity for all brackets. The coefficients are not statistically 
different from each other and consequently confirm the insights of Figure 1, which 
suggests a stable pattern of behavioral effects of conflict exposure over the entire 
lifetime (with a slight decline in later ages). This result is consistent with previous 
findings on the persistent effects over the life cycle of adversities experienced during 
childhood (Gould, Lavy, and Paserman 2011; Shonkoff et al. 2012).
In the next two columns, we further assess the period of childhood during which 
the conflict occurred. In column 2, we add a novel variable of  post-war exposure. 
The variable born after [0–12] takes a value of 1 if there was a civil conflict or a mass 
killing in the 12 years before birth. If the main effect of conflict exposure is about 
economic deprivation or institutional collapse, we should expect the variable born 
after [0–12] to be a similarly powerful predictor as our variable of interest. The results 
show that this is not the case, an issue we return to in Section IVD. In fact, while 
our main explanatory variable of past exposure retains its magnitude and statistical 
significance, the coefficient of born after [0–12] is of much smaller magnitude and 
is not statistically significant at conventional levels. This sharp decrease in crime 
propensity for cohorts born just after the war with respect to those exposed during 
their childhoods is again reassuring for our causal inference as it makes any con-
tamination of the results by omitted variable bias unlikely. In column 3, kid [1–12] 
is split in two, with a separate variable capturing the impact of war exposure during 
the first five years of life, and another variable capturing war exposure between the 
sixth and the twelfth year of life. We observe that the effect is somewhat stronger 
for kid [1–5]. This is consistent with the literature on early child development (e.g., 
Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev 2013) and with earlier studies that show the crucial 
4401COUTTENIER ET AL.: THE VIOLENT LEGACY OF CONFLICTVOL. 109 NO. 12
importance of these first five years of life for a large array of social and economic 
outcomes (Gould, Lavy, and Paserman 2011), as well as for delinquency during 
adulthood (see, e.g., Shaw and Gross 2008). Finally, given that in other contexts 
prenatal wartime famine has been linked to  antisocial behavior later in life (e.g., 
Neugebauer, Hoek, and Susser 1999), we include a measure of prenatal exposure 
(i.e., prenatal takes the value of 1 for conflict taking place in the year of birth). We 
do not detect any effect of the latter in our sample (column 4).
Later Ages of Conflict Exposure: We now study the impact on criminal behavior 
of conflict exposure at later ages for the baseline sample of male asylum seekers. In 
our baseline analysis, the main explanatory variable is kid [1–12], a binary measure 
of childhood exposure between ages 1 and 12. Here we expand the analysis to all 
potential periods of exposure over the lifetime. For every starting age  s ∈ [1, 30] 
and end age  e ∈ [s, 70] , we construct a dummy expo[s–e] that indicates whether a 
given cohort was exposed to a civil conflict/mass killing between the ages of  s and  e . 
For each possible combination of [s–e] we estimate a variant of equation (1) where 
kid is now replaced by expo[s–e]; note that the set of other exposure dummies 
expo (k) is adjusted accordingly such that  k ∉ [s, e] . The t-statistic of the estimated 
coefficient of expo[s–e] is then reported in Figure 3 with different shades of gray, 
darker colors representing higher significance. Panel A focuses on early age expo-
sure. The results once again confirm the crucial importance of exposure in the five 
earliest years of life, although we also find that exposure during early adulthood 
matters for violent crime later in life. Additional analyses (victimization, women) 
are performed in online Appendix A6.
C. Intensity of Conflict Exposure
Are children more likely to develop future criminal behaviors when they are 
exposed to more severe conflicts? Or to rampant conflicts that last for many years? 
The baseline analysis focuses on the effect of exposure at the extensive margin (i.e., 
our binary measure of exposure kid [1–12]). In this section, we look at the intensive 
margin and investigate whether the severity of conflict and the duration of exposure 
affect asylum seekers’ future criminal behavior.
Severity of Conflicts: Table 15 shows the heterogeneous impact of past exposure 
according to the severity of the conflict in the origin country.25 In column 1 our 
main explanatory variable is interacted with the inverse of the country of origin 
size. The reasoning here is that the UCDP/PRIO conflict threshold is defined in 
terms of the absolute number of fatalities and hence is likely to pick up more minor 
conflicts in large than in small countries. We measure size in terms of surface ( k m 2 ) 
and not population in order to mitigate any reverse causation bias from conflict 
25 Ideally, we would exploit both the geographical location of conflict within a  country-year and place of birth 
to build a more accurate measure of individual exposure to violence. Unfortunately, we have neither information 
on the birthplace of asylum seekers nor on the within country-year location of conflict worldwide (i.e., providers of 
 microdata such as the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) cover some but not all countries).
4402 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2019
severity to population size.26 The coefficient of the interaction term is positive but 
not significantly different from 0. In column 2 we turn to a more accurate assess-
ment of the severity of past exposure. We construct three mutually exclusive quan-
tiles of conflict severity, measured as the number of  battle-related deaths in a given 
 country-year weighted by the area of the country.27 The results show that exposure 
to  high-severity violence during childhood has a stronger impact on violent crime 
than exposure to medium- or  low-severity violence. In the same vein, column 3 
displays the effect of mass killing severity. To construct the three quantiles of sever-
ity, we rely on the  country-year number of deaths index provided by the Political 
Instability Task Force (2016), weighted by country area.28 Here again the coeffi-
cients are ordered very clearly: the largest impact is for highly severe  mass killings, 
followed by events of medium severity, while we detect no impact for mass killings 
of low severity.
Duration of Exposure: The role played by the duration of exposure to conflict 
is explored in Table 16.29 We measure this intensive margin with a new variable of 
interest, nb. years of exposure, which captures the total number of years of exposure, 
only during childhood in the first two columns, during all life in the remaining col-
umns. We start with the intensive margin only (column 1), then the extensive margin 
is added (column 2). We replicate these specifications with the intensive margin 
extended to all life exposure (columns 3 and 4). The point estimates show that both 
margins matter but with some quantitative imbalance (6 : 1 ratio in column 4): the 
first year of exposure increases future crime propensity by  1.085 percentage points, 
any additional year increases it by 0.163 percentage points. Hence, there is evidence 
of some cumulative effect of longer exposure but most of the action is driven by 
the very fact of being exposed at least one year. We detect a similar pattern when 
we focus on exposure to civil conflict only or mass killings only (columns 5 to 8). 
However the imbalance is larger in the case of civil conflict (8 : 1 ratio) and smaller 
for mass killings (2 : 1 ratio), which could be related to the fact that the latter events 
specifically target civilian populations.
Finally, equipped with this measure of the intensive margin, we revisit the role of 
the timing of the first year of exposure to conflict. Figure 4 (panel A) replicates the 
specification of column 3 in Table 16 with the intensive margin being split into  12 
different conditional intensive margins, i.e., [nb. years of exposure if first expo-
sure at age t]; hence, there is a coefficient for each possible year of first exposure 
before age  12 . For example, for an individual who has been exposed to a conflict 
from the age of  6 to  16 we code [nb. years of exposure if first exposure at age 6] 
= 11, and all the other conditional margins at zero. As this exercise is demanding 
 information-wise, we observe some variability in the coefficients.
26 A second major concern with population is that, beyond affecting how binding a given fatality threshold is, 
it has been found in the literature to have a direct  conflict-fueling effect (see, e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004, Brückner 2010), which would make it tricky to interpret the coefficient if our main explanatory 
variable were to be interacted with the inverse of the population size.
27 For an average area in the sample, low severity corresponds to less than 899 casualties by  country-year, 
medium severity to up to 6,059 casualties, and high severity to more than 6,059 casualties.
28 The first quantile corresponds to a range of 0 to 32,000 deaths, the second quantile up to 128,000 deaths, and 
the third quantile contains the rest.
29 We use a similar approach here to that of Chetty and Hendren (2018).
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In order to differentiate between the two margins, we replicate in Figure 4 (panel 
B) the specification of column 4 in Table 16 with the set of 12 conditional intensive 
margins complemented with a set of 12 conditional extensive margins, i.e., first 
exposure at age t. Here again we find an imbalance between the extensive margin 
and the intensive margin. The overall implication is that while the cumulative inten-
sity may matter somewhat, clearly the really big driver of our effect is the extensive 
margin, i.e., being exposed versus  non-exposed.
D. Contextual Factors during Childhood
Various potential mechanisms contribute to the causal impact of violence expo-
sure on future crime propensity, the main ones being (i) the psychological trauma 
of victimization, (ii) the effects of economic deprivation during war on pervasive 
developmental disorders or on human capital acquisition and preferences, or (iii) 
societal factors such as the collapse of social capital and altered moral norms cre-
ating lasting grievances toward other groups. While challenging to completely rule 
out some channels and prove the predominance of others, in this section we take a 
first step in this direction by evaluating the relative plausibility of several mecha-
nisms. More specifically, we examine in Table 17 the role of the  socio-economic 
environment during childhood for  conflict-exposed cohorts. To this end we control 
for contextual factors from the country of origin that could covary with exposure to 
civil conflict or mass killing during childhood. In other words, we construct average 
measures of these contextual factors during the childhood of cohorts (i.e., between 
1 and 12 years of age). In column 1 we control for the average percentage of people 
with access to primary schooling in the years when the underlying individuals in 
our study were aged younger than 12.30 Column 2 estimates the baseline specifi-
cation on the same reduced sample of column 1, but without including the educa-
tion exposure variable. The coefficient of interest of kid [1–12] is almost identical in 
both columns, and the coefficient of education exposure is statistically insignificant. 
In columns 3 and 4, we find that while the average democracy score in the home 
country during childhood is not statistically significant, the coefficient of conflict 
exposure remains significant and of similar magnitude with and without the democ-
racy exposure control. In columns 5 to 6 we focus on GDP per capita, but detect no 
impact of poverty during childhood. However, the coefficient of exposure to conflict 
remains positive but loses its statistical significance due to the sample size reduc-
tion. We reach similar conclusions in column 7 where the three childhood contextual 
factors are simultaneously included.
Overall, our results suggest that it is unlikely that the mechanism at work is purely 
based on human capital depletion, economic deprivation, or institutional collapse. 
Note that the scope of this exercise is constrained by the limited data availability of 
 cohort-level characteristics. However, this problem is alleviated in the next section 
30 Note that the available education indicator used here is somewhat coarse: it corresponds to the percentage of 
the population aged above 15 with at least a primary education. While it captures the state of the education system 
in a given year, it is not a specific, precise measure of education exposure of the cohort being of schooling age, but 
also reflects the education of older generations.
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by the inclusion of  cohort-specific fixed effects in the bilateral crime regressions that 
absorb all the (observed and unobserved) heterogeneity.
V. Bilateral Crime Regressions and Targeted Violence
In this section we exploit a unique feature of our dataset on criminality in 
Switzerland, namely information on the nationalities of both perpetrators and vic-
tims. We use this information to build the bilateral crime propensity,  CP n,a,v,t , defined 
as the  cohort-level share of individuals of nationality  n and age  a who perpetrate at 
least one violent crime in year  t against victims from a specific nationality  v .31 
Crucially, this enables the inclusion of cohort fixed effects, resulting in the inference 
being based purely on bilateral characteristics, an approach grounded in the grav-
ity trade literature. Hence, all the  cohort-specific unobserved heterogeneity is now 
absorbed by the fixed effects. As shown below, our main result is that, everything 
else equal, the likelihood that perpetrators and victims are  co-nationals is much 
larger among asylum seekers who have been exposed to civil conflict or mass killing 
during childhood. A possible interpretation is that  inter-group hostilities persist over 
time and transit to Switzerland.
When building bilateral crime propensities, we continue to assess cohorts of asy-
lum seekers on the perpetrator side. In line with our previous analysis, we restrict 
our main estimates to the sample of adult male cohorts from countries that experi-
enced at least one conflict since 1946. For potential victims, we pool together all 
nationals of a given country living in Switzerland, independent of their gender, age, 
or status (i.e., asylum seekers, migrants, natives). Our  cohort-level sample is crossed 
with the nationality of victims such that the unit of observation is now a cohort 
of perpetrators of nationality (n) × age group (a) × year (t) targeting victims of 
nationality (v). We estimate the following bilateral version of crime equation (1):
(3)   CP n,a,v,t =  α 0 ×  1 n=v +  α 1 ×  ( kid [1–12] n,a,t ×  1 n=v ) 
 +  ∑ 
k=13
 
80+
β (k) ×  (expo (k) n,a,t ×  1 n=v ) +  FE n,a,t +  FE v,t +  ε n,a,v,t ,
where  CP n,a,v,t corresponds to bilateral propensity to violent crime and  1 n=v is a 
binary indicator function equal to 1 if perpetrator and victim are  co-nationals. Our 
focus here is on the interaction term  kid [1–12] n,a,t ×  1 n=v . Finding a positive coef-
ficient  α 1 means that there is an  over-propensity to target  co-nationals for cohorts 
exposed during childhood. Note that the variables coding for past exposure at later 
age,  expo (k) n,a,t , are also interacted.
Importantly, the bilateral nature of the data allows us to go beyond the battery of 
fixed effects already present in our benchmark crime regression (1). In fact, in addi-
tion to including  FE v,t , which are fixed effects in the nationality of victim × year 
31 Given that our crime data do not contain any information on the ethnic group of the perpetrator or victim of a 
crime, we focus on the general crime propensity among  co-nationals, without being able to construct an  inter-ethnic 
crime propensity.
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dimension, we can now also include  cohort-fixed effects for perpetrators,  FE n,a,t .32 
This is possible because, for a given cohort of perpetrator  (n, a, t) , we observe varia-
tions in bilateral crime propensities across nationalities of victims. Finally, standard 
errors are  two-way clustered at the nationality of perpetrator level and at the nation-
ality of victim level.
Main Results on Targeted Violence: Table 8 displays the estimates of equation (3) 
for the cohorts of perpetrators composed of adult male asylum seekers. Columns 1 
and 4 pool exposure to civil conflict together with exposure to mass killing, columns 2 
and 5 focus only on civil conflict, while columns 3 and 6 only on mass killing. In 
columns 1–3 we include the full battery of fixed effects described above, i.e.,  FE v,t 
and  FE n,a,t and we report the coefficients of the aforementioned variable  1 n=v and 
its interaction with childhood exposure,  kid [1–12] n,a,t ×  1 n=v . Column 1 shows that 
 co-nationals are much more likely to be in a  perpetrator-victim relationship. Indeed 
the coefficient of  1 n=v is not only positive but its magnitude is very large: the pre-
mium attached to  co-nationality is equal to 1.22 percentage points, representing 
30 times the sample mean of bilateral crime propensity (equal to 0.041 percentage 
points). Our interpretation is that  co-nationals interact more frequently (due, for 
example, to shared language or overlapping social networks), which increases the 
potential for disputes. Moreover, the detection probability is likely to be higher for 
32 Note that the linear terms kid [1–12] and  expo(k) are absorbed by the cohort  fixed-effect  FE n,a,t .
Table 8—Bilateral Crime Regressions
Dependent variable: Violent crime propensity
Exposure to: CC, MK CC MK CC, MK CC MK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 1 n=v 1.223 1.197 1.746 1.265 1.237 1.814(0.262) (0.259) (0.251) (0.296) (0.293) (0.314)
 kid [1–12] n,a,t ×  1 n=v 1.449 1.551 1.989 1.437 1.541 1.975(0.518) (0.527) (0.733) (0.538) (0.547) (0.783)
 1 v=CH 1.761 1.713 2.516(0.182) (0.179) (0.238)
 kid [1–12] n,a,t ×  1 v=CH 0.709 0.834 −0.395(0.257) (0.262) (0.399)
Nationality of perpetrator
 × year × age FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nationality of victim × year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Observations 2,380,666 2,370,854 1,084,442 2,380,666 2,370,854 1,084,442
R2 0.035 0.035 0.043 0.033 0.034 0.040
Sample mean
 (bilateral crime propensity)
0.041 0.041 0.047 0.041 0.041 0.047
Notes: Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations based on the sample of male adult cohorts of asylum seekers. 
Robust standard errors are two-way clustered at the nationality of perpetrator and victim levels. The dependent vari-
able Violent crime propensity corresponds to bilateral propensity to violent crime.  1 n=v is a binary indicator func-
tion equal to 1 if the perpetrator and the victim are co-nationals.  1 v=CH is a binary indicator function equal to 1 if 
the victim is a native. kid [1–12] is a binary measure of childhood exposure to civil conflict or mass killing. All esti-
mations include a set of binary variables coding for past exposure, but at later ages  k ∈ {13, 14, 15, …, 80+} inter-
acted with  1 n=v . Therefore, the reference group consists of those individuals born after the last years of violence. 
Abbreviations CC and MK refer respectively to civil conflict and mass killing.
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crimes between  co-nationals (perhaps because the victim and perpetrator know each 
other). More importantly for our research question, the coefficient of the interaction 
term is positive and sizable. Quantitatively, the already large premium attached to 
 co-nationality increases by 118 percent (i.e., 1.449/1.223) when a given cohort of 
potential perpetrators has experienced conflict during childhood. Columns 2 and  3 
confirm that the previous pattern is also detected when focusing only on civil con-
flict or only on mass killing.
Together, these findings show that exposed individuals are much more violent 
toward their own community than are individuals born after a civil conflict/mass 
killing. However, an open question remains as to whether this pattern is due to 
the fact that past exposure to conflict makes people more  crime-prone in general 
or whether the conflict-exposed individuals are more violent specifically toward 
their own community. Certainly, knowing whether violent criminality is confined 
to foreign communities has policy implications for receiving countries. We deal 
with this question in columns 4 to 6 by comparing violence toward  co-nationals 
with violence toward natives. To this end, we include in equation (3) a binary vari-
able,  1 v=CH , indicating whether the victim is a native, together with its interaction 
term  kid [1–12] n,a,t ×  1 v=CH . The estimation of the linear term  1 v=CH forces us to 
remove the victim fixed effects  FE v,t .33 In column 4 the positive coefficient of  1 v=CH 
is quite sizable with respect to the bilateral sample mean (1.76 versus 0.041) show-
ing that, on top of their  co-nationals, perpetrators are more likely to target natives 
than nationals from third countries. Here again this likely reflects more frequent 
social interactions between asylum seekers and natives. The positive coefficient 
on the interaction term shows that exposed individuals are 41 percent more vio-
lent toward natives than are individuals born after a conflict (i.e., 0.709/1.761). 
Interestingly, the magnitude of the effect is very close to our baseline quantification 
(column 2, Table 5, panel A) based on a sample where all victim nationalities are 
pooled together. By comparison, violence of asylum seekers toward their own com-
munity is similar to the results of column 1: exposed individuals are 114 percent 
more violent toward their  co-nationals than are individuals born after a conflict (i.e., 
1.437/1.265). Note that the large sample size leads to coefficients that are precisely 
estimated, making  between-coefficient comparison relatively reliable. In conclu-
sion, although past conflict exposure makes individuals generally more  crime-prone 
toward Swiss natives, we see that this premium almost triples for crimes target-
ing their own community (from 41 percent to 114 percent). This suggests that the 
greater propensity to violent crime of asylum seekers exposed to conflict during 
childhood is mostly confined to their national community, in line with the theo-
ries discussed below on persistence of civil conflicts and the depletion of social 
capital.34 We detect a similar pattern for civil conflict (column 5) and mass killing 
(column 6) (although exposure to mass killing does not seem to increase violence 
33 Note that the residual category  1 v∉{n,CH} consists of nationalities of victims that are neither  co-nationals nor 
natives. This linear term, together with its interaction with  kid [1–12] n,a,t , are not added due to collinearity with the 
 cohort-fixed effects for perpetrators.
34 On a related note, it is striking how low the detected effects are for crimes committed against natives: the coef-
ficient of  1 v=CH is of a similar order of magnitude as that of  1 n=v , meaning that asylum seekers are similarly likely to 
commit a crime against  co-nationals (which may, in most cases, represent a tiny share of total population) as against 
Swiss natives (amounting to roughly three-quarters of the population). This finding complements the unconditional 
evidence presented in Section IIC that only one-third of violence perpetrated by asylum seekers involves natives.
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toward natives). We replicate the full analysis after excluding  intra-family crimes 
in the construction of bilateral crime propensities. The results remain unchanged, 
indicating that the observed crime  over-propensity toward  co-nationals is not driven 
by domestic violence (online Appendix Table A9.25).
Both the signs and the magnitude of the coefficients can be interpreted as evidence 
of persistence in targeted violence. Note that (un)observed characteristics of con-
flict-exposed cohorts are filtered out by the nationality of perpetrator × age × year 
fixed effects. Thus, the results are not driven by channels such as  conflict-induced 
selection into migration,  post-conflict educational dropout, pervasive developmental 
disorders, or changes in the composition of the population. In contrast, theories stress-
ing that past conflicts damage social ties between  co-nationals and that distrust and 
grievances acquired in early childhood persist over the lifetime are consistent with 
our findings. In particular, Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013a) and Acemoglu and 
Wolitzki (2014) argue that war leads to a collapse of  inter-ethnic trust, in turn sowing 
the seeds for more ethnic  inter-group conflict in the future. Taking this theory literally, 
one should not only expect a general tendency of  war-exposed individuals to commit 
more crimes in  post-war contexts but, on top of this, to be frequently involved in com-
mitting crimes that target  co-nationals. To this regard, Roth (2009) gives numerous 
examples of murderous riots between Northern Irish and Catholic Irish emigrants in 
the United States. As far as Switzerland is concerned, for the diaspora of migrants 
from  Sri Lanka living in Switzerland many incidents of “imported conflicts” between 
different ethnic political movements have been documented (Moret, Efionayi, and 
Stants 2007).
Additional Results and Robustness Checks: A series of additional results can 
be found in online Appendix A9, where we replicate columns 1–3 of Table 8 for 
property crimes instead of violent crimes; by category of victims (asylum seekers; 
Swiss natives; economic migrants); on the sample of female perpetrators; with an 
augmented battery of fixed effects that include bilateral fixed effects. We also study 
exposure to military  inter-state disputes (MID) and find some evidence that targeted 
violence is observed in the case of  extra-territorial conflicts.
VI. Combating the Legacy of Conflict: The Role of Policies
In this section, we study how institutions in the host country modulate the impact 
of past exposure to conflict on current criminality of asylum seekers. Our question 
of interest is whether the “right” design of institutions and policies can partly or 
fully alleviate the risk of increased criminality for exposed individuals.
The reference model of crime is that proposed by Becker (1968): the decision to 
commit a crime is driven by the opportunity cost (legal labor market salary) relative 
to returns to crime, discounted by the probability of being caught by the police and 
the sanction imposed by the criminal justice system. This framework is flexible 
enough to also accommodate psychological and social costs and gains from crime. 
For example,  inter-group grievances may reduce the psychological costs of a crime 
directed against a member of the disliked group. However, economic incentives still 
matter. For example, say lower crime costs due to  inter-group grievances can be off-
set by higher opportunity costs of crime due to better economic integration.
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Following this Beckerian logic, in what follows we examine integration policies 
that are likely to shape asylum seekers’ incentives and criminal behaviors. We focus 
on institutional arrangements related to their economic and social integration, which 
are decentralized and mainly set by cantons. In online Appendix A10.6, we comple-
ment this analysis by investigating the role played by the stringency of the asylum 
policy, which is harmonized at the federal level but varies across nationalities. Note 
that as integration policies are not randomized, this exercise cannot go much beyond 
correlations. It is, of course, entirely possible that the local environment has a causal 
impact, but the absence of randomization makes it challenging to rule out all pos-
sible confounders. Though limited, this preliminary evidence is, to our knowledge, 
new to the literature and fills a gap by documenting how public policies can tackle 
the recurrence of violence in the aftermath of conflict.
 Cross-Canton Variations: The federalist constitution of Switzerland guarantees 
substantial autonomy to the cantons, which results in  cross-canton heterogeneity 
of economic and social integration policies. Because asylum seekers are allocated 
early on by the federal state to different cantons, their incentives for engaging in 
crime are consequently shaped by local policies. Thus, a first step in our analysis 
consists of assessing whether the greater crime propensity of individuals exposed to 
conflict during childhood varies substantially across cantons. We show below that 
the answer is a clear yes. We then study the explanatory power of economic and 
social integration policies in shaping this  cross-cantonal pattern.
We implement a  two-step procedure in the spirit of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) 
and Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti (2009). First, we estimate the violent crime pre-
mium (i.e., the coefficient of kid [1–12]) separately for each canton, then we regress 
those  canton-specific premiums on various  canton-level characteristics that include 
policy variables. The specification for the first step is a  canton-level version of the 
baseline equation (1) with flexible coefficients for the variable kid [1–12]:
(4)  CP n,a,t,c =  β c ×  kid [1–12] n,a,t 
 +  ∑ 
k=13
 
80+
γ (k) × expo  (k) n,a,t +  FE c,t +  FE n,t +  FE a +  ε n,a,t,c ,
where  FE c,t are canton × year fixed effects. The inclusion of this additional battery 
of  fixed effects filters out all the  canton-level factors susceptible to affecting the 
absolute level of criminality. Hence, identification of the violent crime premiums 
relies on  within-canton,  within-nationality,  between-cohort variations in crime pro-
pensity. The previous equation is estimated on the baseline sample of adult males 
(column 2, Table 5, panel A), disaggregated at the canton level (Table A5.13). The 
variable kid [1–12] encompasses childhood exposure to civil conflict or mass kill-
ing. Robust standard errors are  two-way clustered at the nationality and  canton-year 
levels.
Our interest lies in the vector of 26  canton-specific effects of childhood conflict 
exposure on future violent crime propensity, namely the point estimates  β ˆc in equa-
tion (4). Figure 2 displays graphically these estimates (baseline sample,  2009–2016) 
together with +/−1 standard error. A visual inspection reveals striking variations 
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across cantons, and this impression is confirmed quantitatively as the relative 
 standard deviation of the distribution of  β ˆc is equal to  0.947/0.612 = 1.547 , indi-
cating a large dispersion. This suggests that contextual factors at the  canton-level 
may substantially modulate the violent crime premium of individuals exposed to 
conflict during childhood. Likely factors include the design of integration policies, 
local economic conditions (GDP, unemployment), and political and cultural atti-
tudes toward refugees and foreigners.35 We next endeavor to assess the specific role 
of policies, controlling for the other factors. This leads to the following second-step 
equation:
(5)  β ˆc = α ×  Policy c +  X c ′ β +  ε c ,
with  X c representing  canton-level controls. This equation captures only how 
 canton-level policies affect the  over-crime propensity of  conflict-exposed individ-
uals compared to  non-exposed individuals (the absolute level of criminality being 
absorbed by the canton × year fixed effects in the  first-step equation (4)). Hence, 
our  two-step approach is not aimed at estimating how policies reduce crime propen-
sities of all asylum seekers.36
35 Our empirical findings below show that among these contextual factors, policies matter more than GDP or 
culture. Indeed the (unreported) OLS coefficients of the control variables in Tables 9 and 10 are quantitatively small.
36 Addressing this question raises empirical challenges that go beyond the scope of this paper. We nonetheless 
make a first attempt by directly estimating equation (5) with  canton-specific average crime propensity as dependent 
variable and by replicating all the specifications in Tables 9 and 10 with this new variable. The estimates show 
that no statistical effect of our two policy variables (open job access and civic courses, see below) on  canton-level 
criminality is detected (see online Appendix A10.3 for more details). This finding suggests that policies are effec-
tive only for those who were  conflict-exposed during childhood but not for all asylum seekers. Note however that 
we are extremely cautious in the interpretation of this  non-result due to the impossibility of filtering out for canton 
× year fixed effects in the  first-step equation (4), making the dependent variable very noisy and raising concerns 
relative to omitted variable bias in the estimation procedure of equation (5).
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Figure 2. The Estimated Coefficients of kid [1–12] across Cantons
Note: The 26 points correspond to the  β ˆc coefficients of the first step estimation for the 26 cantons (estimated on 
the sample of adult male asylum seekers for the  2009–2016 period), ordered by magnitude. The vertical lines rep-
resent +/−1 standard error.
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Given that we know the precision with which each cantonal coefficient  β ˆc is esti-
mated, the previous equation can be estimated using generalized least squares (GLS) 
technique. We account for the measurement error of the  left-hand-side variable by 
weighting each observation by the inverse of the standard errors estimated in the first 
stage. Note that, with 26 observations, the small sample size makes the detection 
of any statistical effect challenging. We believe that the large dispersion in the dis-
tribution of  β ˆc partially compensates for this drawback. Moreover, policy adoption 
at the cantonal level is not random, and the consequential problem of selection on 
observables is difficult to address given the limited number of degrees of freedoms 
(and thus the restricted set of controls we can account for). We circumvent this issue 
by making use of various propensity score matching methods (see below). Finally, 
the vector of control variables  X c consists of (i)  pre-sample cantonal GDP per capita; (ii)  pre-sample cantonal unemployment rates; (iii) difference in employment rates 
of second generation migrants with respect to  non-migrant population at the canton 
level; (iv) average percentage of citizens in a canton voting in the years  1991–2007 
for the main  right-wing party, the Swiss People’s Party (i.e., SVP/UDC)37; and (v) 
a dummy taking a value of 1 for (majority)  French-speaking cantons (which have 
traditionally taken a more  pro-migration stand). Detailed descriptions and summary 
statistics of all variables can be found in online Appendix A10.
Labor Market Integration: We start with policies related to the labor market 
integration of asylum seekers, which may affect the opportunity cost of engaging 
in criminal activity.38 This factor is particularly salient for asylum seekers, who are 
often severely cash constrained and indebted from financing their travel to Europe. 
Besides altering the opportunity cost of crime, there is also a mechanical effect 
of hours spent working being time not dedicated to alternative, potentially illegal, 
activities.
Our main variable coding for labor market integration is open job access. This 
binary variable is equal to  1 for cantons where asylum seekers can start working in 
all sectors of activity three months after arrival; throughout Switzerland, federal law 
bans working for the first three months. It is equal to  0 in cantons where the cantonal 
administration (i) extends the working ban beyond three months, or (ii) restricts work 
carried out by asylum seekers to certain sectors, or (iii) actively discourages their 
access to jobs.39 The coding of this variable is based on official documentation of 
the highest  inter-cantonal authority (Kantonsdirektorenkonferenz), covering respec-
tively the years 2011 and 2016. In 25 out of 26 cantons, the approach is the same in 
both years, consistent with our goal of capturing stable labor market policies over 
37 This party has, since the early 1990s, taken a very firm position on limiting immigration into Switzerland. 
This measure is missing for two small Swiss cantons (Nidwalden, Obwalden) where for a part of the period under 
study there were respectively single uncontested candidates and hence no elections took place.
38 This issue has received considerable attention in the press and has been the subject of much public debate 
(see, e.g., New York Times, September 18, 2015, “Germany Works to Get Migrants Jobs,” and The Economist, 
August 27, 2015, “Let Them in and Let Them Earn”). The academic literature on crime has found that labor market 
access critically affects criminal behavior (see, e.g., Freeman 1999; Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard 2002; Fougère, 
Kramarz, and Pouget 2009; Bell, Fasani, and Machin 2013).
39 The legal framework relative to labor market integration is further discussed in online Appendix A2.
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the entire time period (see details in online Appendix A10.1).40 We exclude from the 
sample the only canton that changed its regulations (i.e.,  Appenzell-Innerrhoden, 
which incidentally is the smallest Swiss canton, accounting for roughly 0.26 percent 
of the asylum seekers over the period).41 Our construction of the variable open job 
access deliberately emphasizes the de jure dimension of labor market participation. 
By contrast, the sensitivity analysis in online Appendix A10.3 also looks at de facto 
participation, or actual employment rates (which arguably are endogenous to the 
characteristics of the pool of asylum seekers considered). Importantly, as shown in a 
recent paper by Slotwinski, Stutzer, and Uhlig (2018), cantonal differences in labor 
market access regulations are a strong determinant of actual employment rates in 
Switzerland.
Table 9 reports the estimates of equation (5) with open job access as our policy 
variable. We restrict the sample used for the  first-step estimation (equation (4)) to 
years for which our official sources provide reliable information, i.e., the  2011–2016 
period (column 1). The coefficient of interest is statistically significant and has the 
expected negative sign, indicating that cantons granting labor market access to asylum 
seekers experience a lower effect on the violent crime propensity of  conflict-exposed 
individuals. To alleviate concerns about omitted variable bias, we include in column 
2 the battery of control variables mentioned above. The sample size decreases by 2 
cantons (out of 26) due to missing information. Still, the coefficient is even more pre-
cisely estimated, with a magnitude comparable to its value in column 1. Restricting 
the sample to  2011–2016 is somewhat conservative, as the striking persistence of job 
market policies over this period may well extend further back in time. In column 3 we 
consequently replicate the previous specification with a  first-step estimation based on 
the full period,  2009–2016. The point estimate is quantitatively similar.
As discussed above, the small sample size limits the number of included variables 
that control for endogenous selection of policy. However, selection does not seem to 
40 In 16 out of these 25 cantons the variable open job access takes a value of 1, while it equals 0 in the remaining 
9 cantons.
41 When we include  Appenzell-Innerrhoden we get similar results. Whichever way we code it (as 0 or 1), the 
coefficient of interest has a negative sign and is statistically significant, as shown in online Appendix Table A10.36.
Table 9—The Impact of Open Job Access
Dependent variable:  β ˆc 
Sample: 2011–2016 2011–2016 2009–2016 2009–2016 2009–2016 2009–2016
Specification: No controls Controls Controls PSM RHS Inv. prob. W. PSM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
open job access −0.640 −0.762 −0.625 −0.644 −0.419 −0.748
(0.366) (0.315) (0.320) (0.326) (0.281) (0.305)
Number of cantons 25 23 23 23 23 23
R2 0.246 0.526 0.598 0.471 0.491 N/A
Note: Estimations at the canton level for the regression equation (5). GLS estimations in columns 1 to 4, OLS esti-
mation in column 5, and propensity score matching estimation in column 6. The dependent variable consists of the 
estimated coefficients at the canton level from the regression equation (4). Open job access is a binary variable 
equal to  1 for cantons where asylum seekers can start working in all sectors of activity 3 months after arrival or 
it is equal to 0 in cantons where the cantonal administration (i) extends the working ban beyond three months, or 
(ii) restricts work by asylum seekers to certain sectors of activity, or (iii) actively discourages their access to jobs. 
Standard errors in parentheses.
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be a  first-order issue in our data. Indeed, applying the methodology of Oster (2017) 
suggests that our results, if anything, underestimate the true effect. Nevertheless, in 
columns 4 to 6 we use a complementary approach based on propensity score match-
ing (PSM) in order to make the samples of treated cantons ( open job access = 1 ) 
and untreated observations ( open job access = 0 ) more comparable. This provides 
a flexible way to allow various factors to affect the treatment (Imbens and Rubin 
2015). To compute the propensity scores, we consider a Probit estimator together 
with linear, higher order, and interactive combinations within the set of control vari-
ables used above. We apply the approach of Imbens and Rubin (2015) for select-
ing the combination of predictors for the propensity score model. Based on the 
 canton-specific estimates of the propensity scores ( ps), we perform three standard 
exercises: (i) we directly include ps as a control variable in equation (5) (column 4); 
(ii) we implement a method of inverse probability weighting following Abadie and 
Cattaneo (2018) (column 5)42; (iii) we display the PSM estimates of the average 
treatment effect using nearest neighbor matching (with replacement, which is well 
suited, given the small sample size) (column 6).43
The coefficient of open job access in Table 9 displays a consistent negative pat-
tern throughout the specifications.44 It is both precisely estimated and stable in 
terms of magnitude. This supports the view that the labor market integration of 
asylum seekers mitigates the detrimental effect of childhood exposure to conflict 
on future violent criminality. Quantitatively, this mitigating effect is substantial. 
When excluding the two extreme point estimates, we see that the point estimate of 
open job access is on average equal to −0.66, showing that labor market integration 
reduces the violent crime premium by  two-thirds with respect to its baseline level 
(equal to 1.08 in column 2, Table 5, panel A). We can also compute the counter-
factual change in criminal behavior induced by a more/less lenient labor market 
policy. Recall that the overall effect revealed by the baseline estimates is that the 
effect of childhood exposure corresponds to 35 percent of the sample mean. The 
overall effect corresponds to the current situation: in 16 cantons open job access is 
present, in the remaining 9 it is absent. In contrast, under a scenario where (as it is 
currently the case in Germany and France) labor market access would be denied to 
asylum seekers across the Swiss territory (i.e., with the 16 cantons switching their 
policy to no job access), this number would go up to 48 percent. In other words, the 
crime propensity of  conflict-exposed cohorts would be 48 percent larger than the 
propensity of the average cohort. Alternatively, under the opposite scenario where 
labor market access would be granted in all cantons (i.e., with 9 cantons granting 
open job access), this figure would drop to 25 percent.
Social Integration: Labor market integration is intertwined with social integration, 
and one can expect social integration to directly reduce the crime risk by increasing 
42 This estimator uses  1/ps to weight observations in the treatment group and  1/(1 − ps) to weight control 
group observations.
43 A fourth exercise consists of trimming the sample by removing all observations that are off common support. 
While we do this, in fact, for other variables, it turns out that for open job access all observations are on support, 
such that trimming would result in the identical sample as used in column 3.
44 In online Appendix A10.3 we report further methodological aspects of PSM (diagnostic tests, estimation, 
and matching methods), investigate the potential impact of outliers (Table A10.36), and use alternative measures of 
labor market integration (Tables A10.37 and A10.38).
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the opportunity cost of unlawful behavior, as well as indirectly by improving labor 
market outcomes. In what follows, we investigate the impact on violent criminal 
behavior of civic courses targeting asylum seekers and transmitting general knowl-
edge about Swiss history, social norms, and civic culture. Our measure, civic courses, 
is a binary variable, taking a value of 1 if a canton offers such courses for asylum 
seekers, and 0 otherwise. The information source is a retrospective survey conducted 
in 2011 among civil servants in 22 cantons by Wichmann et al. (2011).45 Additional 
details are provided in online Appendix A10. The  cross-canton correlation between 
open job access and civic courses is quite low, around 0.16, showing that economic 
and social integration policies are not systematically implemented by the same can-
tons. This result leads us to assess the effect of civic courses on violent crime pre-
miums independently of open job access.46 Table 10 displays the estimation results 
of equation (5) with civic courses as policy variable. Given that information on this 
policy is only available for 2011, we restrict the  first-step estimation sample to the 
years close to the time of the survey ( 2009–2012) as a compromise between data 
availability and sample size reduction. Only the last specification (column 7) extends 
the sample to the full period  2009–2016. This last exercise has the virtue of testing the 
robustness of our results, but must be interpreted with caution as there is no guarantee 
that the policy variable remains stable in all cantons after 2012. In column 1 the OLS 
estimate of the coefficient of interest is negative and precisely estimated; it shows that 
civic courses tend to reduce the deleterious impact of childhood exposure to conflict 
on crime propensity. The inclusion of our set of  canton-specific controls leaves the 
magnitude of the coefficient similar (column 2). Here again the methodology of Oster 
(2017) indicates that endogenous selection of integration policy is not a major issue in 
our context. As above, in Table 10 we once again employ PSM methods to make the 
sample of treated cantons more comparable to that of the  non-treated cantons. Using 
the estimated propensity scores, four exercises are performed: (i) we trim the sample, 
removing all observations that are off common support (column 3); (ii) we include the 
propensity score a control variable (column 4); (iii) we perform an inverse probability 
weighting method (column 5); (iv) we report the PSM estimate (column  6 ); and repli-
cate the previous one with the full period sample (column 7). All in all, our coefficient 
of interest remains negative, stable across specifications, and precisely estimated.47 
Quantitatively, the effect is sizable and comparable to that of labor market access.
VII. Economic Migrants
For the purpose of identification, our empirical analysis has thus far focused on 
asylum seekers as this category of migrants is exogenously allocated across cantons. 
45 The variable civic courses takes a value of 1 in 9 cantons, and 0 in the remaining 13 cantons.
46 The joint estimation of the effect of open job access and civic courses is statistically challenging for two reasons. 
Firstly, due to data limitations, the former variable is accurately measured over the  2011–2016 period while the latter 
one is defined over the  2009–2012 period. Secondly, the implementation of PSM methods with multiple treatments 
is constrained by the small sample size. Nevertheless, in online Appendix A10.5, we circumvent these difficulties by 
replicating both Tables 9 and 10 with the other policy variable directly included as a control (either as covariate in OLS 
specifications, or as a predictor in the propensity score model). This demanding approach yields point estimates that 
are quantitatively comparable to the results based on independent estimation of the policy variables.
47 In online Appendix A10.4 we discuss the methodological aspects of the PSM, perform an outlier analysis 
(Table A10.43), and present further results on variables linked to social integration policies, such as the provision of 
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As shown in the previous section, the integration of asylum seekers in the labor 
market dampens the impact of childhood exposure to conflict on crime propensity 
later in life. It remains, however, an open question as to whether this beneficial 
effect of integration is also present for a larger sample of migrants with a more com-
plete and  longer-run economic integration. We replicate our baseline analysis for 
the sample of all economic migrants in an effort to address this question.48 Working 
from a Beckerian framework, one would expect economic migrants to have com-
parable social costs and benefits of crime as asylum seekers, but to face much more 
substantial economic costs due to their better integration in the labor market. We 
consequently expect these differential incentives to translate into a smaller violent 
crime premium of conflict exposure for economic migrants compared to for asylum 
seekers.
The group of migrants holding B or C permits represented 24 percent of the total 
Swiss population in 2016 (2 million out of 8.3 million people), which makes our 
analysis on this sample a particularly powerful external validity check.49 Economic 
migrants are not allocated exogenously across cantons; they are completely free 
to settle wherever they prefer in Switzerland, i.e.,  crime-prone individuals can 
 self-select into  crime-facilitating cantons. To alleviate this concern, we include 
canton × year fixed effects in our baseline equation  (1), requiring the use of the 
 cohort-level sample disaggregated at the canton level. Hence, the dependent variable 
becomes  CP c,n,a,t , the crime propensity of cohort  n, a, t in canton  c .
language courses (Table A10.44), the type of management of asylum centers (private versus public) (Table A10.45), 
and the amount of financial social assistance (Table A10.46). For all of these additional policy measures we do not 
detect any statistically significant effect.
48 Economic migrants have typically lived in Switzerland for many years, benefit from the  long-run per-
spective to stay in Switzerland and are, unsurprisingly, on average much better integrated into the Swiss labor 
market. Employment rates for our sample of asylum seekers range from below 1 percent for the canton of 
 Appenzell-Innerrhoden to slightly above 20 percent for Graubuenden, while the average employment rate of eco-
nomic migrants lies around 80 percent, similar to that of the natives (Federal Statistical Office 2017).
49 As described in Section II, B permit holders are those resident foreign nationals with a valid employment 
contract. This permit is issued for five years and is renewable. C permit holders are those settled foreign nationals 
who have been in Switzerland for at least five years and their right to settle in the country is not subject to any time 
restrictions or conditions. The B permit holders make up 8 percent, and the C permit holders 16 percent, of the total 
population. Source: Statistics on Foreigners and Asylum Seekers (2017, p. 13).
Table 10—The Impact of Civic Courses
Dependent variable:  β ˆc 
Sample: 2009–2012 2009–2012 2009–2012 2009–2012 2009–2012 2009–2012 2009–2016
Specification: No controls Controls Trimming PSM RHS Inv. prob. W. PSM PSM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
civic courses −1.083 −0.997 −1.324 −1.165 −0.889 −1.183 −0.851
(0.555) (0.595) (0.664) (0.605) (0.553) (0.506) (0.283)
Number of cantons 22 21 19 22 22 21 22
R2 0.322 0.500 0.521 0.327 0.317 N/A N/A
Notes: Estimations at the canton level for the regression equation (5). GLS estimations in columns 1 to 4, OLS esti-
mation in column 5 and propensity score matching estimation in columns 6 to 7. The dependent variable consists 
of the estimated coefficients at the canton level from the regression equation (4). Civic courses is a binary variable, 
taking a value of 1 if a canton offers courses on general Swiss history, social norms, and civic culture targeted at 
asylum seekers, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses.
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In our sample, we observe a yearly average of around 718,000 adult male eco-
nomic migrants and 605,000 adult female economic migrants over the  2009–2016 
period. After aggregating by nationality  n and age  a , for each year  t and each can-
ton  c , this leaves us with a sample of 357,661 adult male cohorts (83 age categories 
from 120 countries) and 375,915 adult female cohorts (83 age categories from 121 
countries), which are our units of observation. Table 11 reports the main descrip-
tive statistics for the cohorts of economic migrants. The share of male cohorts who 
originate from countries that have experienced at least one episode of civil conflict 
or mass killing since 1946 is much lower than for asylum seekers (58 percent versus 
92 percent). The sample mean of conflict exposure during childhood, kid [ 1–12], is 
also lower for economic migrants, 30 percent versus 51 percent for asylum seekers. 
Finally, economic migrants are also on average less violent: the sample mean of 
their violent crime propensity is equal to 1.15 percent, roughly one-third of the aver-
age crime propensity of asylum seekers. This is in line with the results of Section VI 
on the  crime-reducing impact of labor market access.
Baseline Results (Economic Migrants): Table 12 replicates a  canton-level ver-
sion of the baseline Table 5 with the sample of economic migrants. All specifi-
cations include age group, canton × year fixed effects, nationality × year fixed 
effects, and a set of binary variables coding for past exposure, but at the later ages 
k ∈ {13, 14, 15, …, 80+} . We report only our coefficient of interest that captures 
the violent crime  over-propensity of cohorts exposed to civil war or mass killing 
during childhood ( 1–12 years), the reference group being cohorts born after con-
flict. Throughout all the columns, the coefficient of kid [ 1–12] is positive but less 
precisely estimated than its baseline counterpart for asylum seekers, even for the 
sample of men (e.g., the  p-value is 0.17 in column  2 and 0.12 in column  3 ), likely 
due to measurement errors on childhood exposure of economic migrants.50 More 
50 Note that a substantial share of economic migrants (holding B and C permits) are actually second- (or even 
third-) generation migrants and were born in Switzerland (true of 21 percent of the migrants for whom we have 
information on birth place). This aspect creates substantial statistical noise in the sample of economic migrants 
when defining the measure of exposure to conflict during childhood. In contrast, this measurement error is not 
present for asylum seekers, as hardly any of them grew up in Switzerland.
Table 11—Cohorts of Economic Migrants: Summary Statistics
Men Women
 
Variable
 
Mean
Standard 
deviation
 
Min.
 
Max.
 
Mean
Standard 
deviation
 
Min.
 
Max.
Cohort size (number of individuals) 16.06 56.35 1 1,830 12.88 43.19 1 1,650
History of civil conflict 
 or mass killing (%)
57.80 49.39 0 100 56.77 49.54 0 100
History of civil conflict (%) 58.51 49.27 0 100 57.20 49.48 0 100
History of mass killing (%) 20.05 40.03 0 100 18.95 39.19 0 100
kid [1–12] (CC or MK, %) 30.38 45.99 0 100 29.27 45.50 0 100
kid [1–12] (CC, %) 29.42 45.57 0 100 28.19 44.99 0 100
kid [1–12] (MK, %) 9.20 28.90 0 100 8.40 27.74 0 100
Violent crime propensity ( CP n,a,t , %) 1.15 8.13 0 100 0.26 3.79 0 100
Notes: All summary statistics are based on 357,661 cohorts of males and 375,915 cohorts of females aged at least 
18. Abbreviations CC and MK refer respectively to civil conflict and mass killing.
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importantly, the coefficient of interest is smaller in size than its counterpart for 
asylum seekers, both in absolute and relative terms. In our preferred specification 
of column 2 the (statistically  non-significant) coefficient is equal to 0.28, which is 
indeed much smaller than its counterpart (i.e., 1.08) in the baseline Table 5. In addi-
tion, the ratio of the coefficient with respect to the sample mean of crime propensity 
is smaller for economic migrants (0.28/1.64 versus 1.08/3.09 for asylum seekers). 
In other words, cohorts of economic migrants exposed to civil conflict/mass kill-
ing during childhood are 17 percent more prone to violent crimes than the average 
cohort of economic migrants; this figure amounts to 35 percent for asylum seekers. 
This suggests that while our baseline results may be generalizable to a broader con-
text than just that of asylum seekers, it also underlines once again the crucial role of 
Table 12—Violent Crime Propensity and Conflict Exposure: Economic Migrants
Dependent variable: Violent crime propensity
Sample: Full CC and MK CC MK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Men
kid [1–12] 0.307 0.280
(0.227) (0.205)
kid [1–12] (only CC) 0.304
(0.198)
kid [1–12] (only MK) 0.781
(0.722)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nationality × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 357,661 206,725 201,365 71,615
R2 0.061 0.064 0.065 0.090
Sample mean (crime propensity) 1.15 1.64 1.67 2.65
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B. Women
kid [1–12] 0.028 0.009
(0.040) (0.041)
kid [1–12] (only CC) 0.025
(0.040)
kid [1–12] (only MK) −0.030
(0.068)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nationality × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 375,915 213,400 206,504 71,117
R2 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.017
Sample mean (crime propensity) 0.26 0.35 0.36 0.47
Notes: OLS estimations based on the sample of adult cohorts of economic migrants (B and C permits). Robust stan-
dard errors are clustered at the nationality levels. The dependent variable stands for the violent crime propensity of 
a cohort of nationality (n) × age (a) × year (t). kid [1–12] is a binary measure of childhood exposure to civil conflict 
or mass killing (columns 1 to 2), to civil conflict only (column 3), or to mass killing only (column 4). In columns 2 
to 4, the sample is restricted to cohorts originating from countries that have experienced civil conflict or mass kill-
ings since 1946. Panel A is confined to the male adult cohorts and panel B to the female adult cohorts of asylum 
seekers. All estimations include age fixed effects, canton × year fixed effects, nationality × year fixed effects, and 
a set of binary variables coding for past exposure, but at the later ages  k ∈ {13, 14, 15, …, 80+} . Therefore, the 
reference group consists of those individuals born after the last years of violence. Abbreviations CC and MK refer 
respectively to civil conflict and mass killing.
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economic integration in moderating the deleterious effect of past conflict exposure 
on violence.
Targeted Violence (Economic Migrants): We now document the persistence of 
 intra-national violence following the logic of Section V. Table 13 replicates the bilat-
eral crime regressions of Table 8 with the sample of economic migrants. Regarding 
the definition of bilateral violence, for perpetrators we focus on economic migrants 
only, while for potential victims we take into account all nationals of a given country 
living in Switzerland (i.e., asylum seekers, migrants, and natives). The large sample 
size yields precise estimates and the variables of interest all have the expected pos-
itive sign. From a qualitative and quantitative perspective, the results are similar to 
those obtained with asylum seekers: violent crimes mostly target  co-nationals and 
this detrimental effect of  co-nationality is exacerbated for cohorts exposed to civil 
conflict and mass killing during their childhood. Here again, the results suggest that, 
among economic migrants,  inter-group hostilities may persist over time and transit 
to Switzerland.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper studies the population of asylum seekers in Switzerland over the 
 2009–2016 period and shows that exposure to civil conflict and mass killing during 
childhood ( 1–12 years of age) has a robust, strong, and persistent magnifying 
Table 13—Economic Migrants: Bilateral Crime Regressions
Dependent variable: Violent crime propensity
Exposure to: CC, MK CC MK CC, MK CC MK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 1 n=v 0.256 0.261 0.527 0.257 0.263 0.543(0.089) (0.090) (0.177) (0.105) (0.107) (0.189)
 kid [1–12] n,a,t ×  1 n=v 0.597 0.624 1.256 0.598 0.625 1.252(0.276) (0.285) (0.478) (0.282) (0.292) (0.483)
 1 v=CH 0.336 0.348 0.417(0.070) (0.072) (0.088)
 kid [1–12] n,a,t ×  1 v=CH 0.342 0.351 0.737(0.124) (0.128) (0.157)
Nationality of perpetrator 
 × year × age FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nationality of victim × year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Observations 5,612,793 5,449,244 1,938,825 5,612,793 5,449,244 1,938,825
R2 0.019 0.020 0.030 0.019 0.019 0.028
Sample mean 
 (bilateral crime propensity)
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: OLS estimations based on the sample of male adult cohorts of economic migrants (B and C permits). Robust 
standard errors are two-way clustered at the nationality of perpetrator and victim levels. The dependent variable 
Violent crime propensity corresponds to bilateral propensity to violent crime.  1 n=v is a binary indicator function 
equal to 1 if the perpetrator and the victim are co-nationals.  1 v=CH is a binary indicator function equal to 1 if the 
victim is a native. kid [1–12] is a binary measure of childhood exposure to civil conflict or mass killing. All estima-
tions include a set of binary variables coding for past exposure, but at the later ages  k ∈ {13, 14, 15, …, 80+} inter-
acted with  1 n=v . Therefore, the reference group consists of those individuals born after the last years of violence. 
Abbreviations CC and MK refer respectively to civil conflict and mass killing.
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effect on the propensity to commit violent crime later in life. Contrary to previ-
ous case studies of  post-conflict reconstruction, our empirical strategy focuses on 
migrants and reveals that this persistence in violence is not due to poor institutions 
in  post-conflict states, but that such behavior continues to hold even when people 
live in an environment with fully functional institutions (e.g., Switzerland). We find 
that cohorts exposed to civil conflicts/mass killings during childhood are 35 percent 
more prone to violent crimes than the average cohort. The impact of childhood con-
flict exposure on future violent crime propensity is found to be particularly strong 
for early childhood exposure and is confined to  co-nationals, a finding consistent 
with  inter-group hostility persisting over time.
Our results are relevant to current policy debate in that they do not advocate 
the need for more restrictive immigration policy. As found in Section VI, with a 
 well-funded asylum system that offers rapid access to local labor markets and pro-
vides civil culture courses and opportunities for integration, the risk of an increase 
in crime perpetrated by migrants with conflict backgrounds can be well contained.51 
Our findings may also have implications for  post-conflict reconstruction. The result 
on the key role of labor market integration in helping to break vicious cycles of per-
sistent violence may apply more generally (as recently investigated by Blattman and 
Annan 2016), suggesting the need for particularly strong involvement and support 
from donor countries in the crucial first years following conflict. While, for exam-
ple, the Marshall Plan certainly made a key contribution to Germany’s “economic 
miracle” (Wirtschaftswunder)  post-1945, helping to pave the way to a stable democ-
racy, this lesson has perhaps been forgotten in more recent times, as witnessed by 
the  ill-fated precipitated withdrawal from  post-Gaddafi Libya. More research on 
the role of employment and  long-run perspectives for  post-conflict reconstruction 
should be encouraged.
51 The issue of providing work opportunities is much discussed throughout Europe. There is, for example, 
a lively debate in Germany over the dismal share of asylum seekers with jobs. Indeed, there are only (max-
imum) 7,000 employed asylum seekers in the whole of Germany, according to Die Welt (“Warum kaum ein 
Asylbewerber Arbeit findet,” March 14, 2017, https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article162839446/ Warum-kaum-
ein-Asylbewerber-Arbeit-findet.html). A report from the OECD (2017) argues that the very modest employment 
rates of asylum seekers in Germany may partially be due to low qualifications, poor language skills, and potential 
employers being deterred by asylum seekers’ insecure legal status. The report stresses the usefulness of providing 
courses and training.
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Appendix
Table 14—Life-Cycle Modulation and Early Exposure
Violent crime propensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 kid [1–12] × age [18–29] 0.590
(0.761)
 kid [1–12] × age [30–39] 1.020
(0.491)
 kid [1–12] × age [40–49] 1.457
(0.573)
 kid [1–12] × age [50–59] 1.942
(1.117)
 kid  [1–12] × age [60+] 0.705
(1.215)
 kid [1–12] 1.012 1.098
(0.540) (0.462)
born after [0–12] −0.222 −0.324
(0.590) (0.548)
 kid [1–5] 0.787
(0.406)
 kid [6–12] 0.400
(0.438)
prenatal −0.168
(0.380)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nationality × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,564 12,564 12,564 12,564
R2 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
Sample mean (crime propensity) 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09
Notes: OLS estimations based on the sample of adult male cohorts of asylum seekers origi-
nating from countries that have experienced civil conflict or mass killings since 1946. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the nationality levels. The dependent variable stands for the vio-
lent crime propensity of a cohort of nationality (n) × age (a) × year (t). kid [1–12] is a binary 
measure of childhood exposure to civil conflict or mass killings. age [L–U] is a dummy taking 
the value of 1 if the age of the cohort belongs to the age interval [L, U]. born after [0–12] takes 
a value of 1 if there has been a civil conflict or a mass killing in the 12 years before being born. 
kid [1–5] (kid [6–12]) is a binary measure of childhood exposure to civil conflict or mass kill-
ing between 1 to 5 years of age (6 to 12 years of age). prenatal is a binary measure of prenatal 
exposure to civil conflict or mass killing. All estimations include age fixed effects, nationality 
× year fixed effects, and a set of binary variables coding for past exposure, but at the later ages 
k ∈ {13, 14, 15, …, 80+} .
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Figure 3. The Effect of Violence Exposure on Violent Crimes Propensity: 
All Potential Exposure Windows
Notes: The figure reports the  t-statistic of the estimated coefficient  α in the following equation  CP n,a,t = α ×  expo [s–e] n,a,t +  ∑ k∉[s,e]   β(k) × expo  (k) n,a,t +  FE n,t +  FE a +  ε n,a,t where expo [s–e] is a dummy equal to 1 for 
cohorts that have been exposed to a civil conflict/mass killing between the ages of  s and  e . Each pixel corresponds 
to a  t-statistic for a particular combination of  s and  e in a separate regression, with  (s, e) ∈ [1, 15] × [s, 15] in panel 
A and  (s, e) ∈ [1, 30] × [s, 70] in panel B. Darker colors represents higher  t-statistics so higher significance. The 
estimation sample consists of adult male cohorts of asylum seekers originating from countries that have experienced 
civil conflict or mass killing since 1946.
Figure 4. Intensity and Timing of the Exposure to Conflict during Childhood
Notes: Estimated coefficients and confidence interval at 90 percent are reported. Based on OLS estimations on the 
sample of adult male cohorts of asylum seekers, originating from countries that have experienced civil conflict or 
mass killing since 1946, with robust standard errors clustered at nationality levels. The dependent variable stands 
for the violent crime propensity of a cohort of nationality (n) × age bracket (a) × year (t). All underlying estima-
tions include age fixed effects, nationality × year fixed effects and a set of binary variables coding for past expo-
sure, but at the later ages  k ∈ {13, 14, 15, …, 80+} . Therefore, the reference group consists of those individuals 
born after the last years of violence.
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Table 15—Heterogeneous Effects: Severity of Conflict
Dependent variable: Violent Crime Propensity
Exposure to: CC and MK CC MK
Sample: CC and MK CC MK
(1) (2) (3)
 kid [1–12] 1.141
(0.528)
 kid [1–12] ×  1 _ Size 0.039(0.180)
 kid [1–12]: low severity −0.442 0.383
(0.958) (0.871)
 kid [1–12]: medium severity 1.093 1.312
(1.562) (0.831)
 kid [1–12]: high severity 2.093 2.206
(1.200) (0.849)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes
Nationality × year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,564 12,514 5,737
R2 0.211 0.209 0.209
Sample mean (crime propensity) 3.09 3.11 2.59
Notes: OLS estimations based on the sample of adult male cohorts of asylum seekers. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the nationality levels. The dependent variable stands for the 
violent crime propensity of a cohort of nationality (n) × age (a) × year (t). kid [1–12] is a 
binary measure of childhood exposure to civil conflict or mass killings. All estimations include 
age fixed effects, nationality × year fixed effects, and a set of binary variables coding for past 
exposure, but at the later ages  k ∈ {13, 14, 15, …, 80+} . Therefore, the reference group con-
sists of those individuals born after the last years of violence. Our main explanatory variable 
as well as the exposure variables for the later ages  k ∈ {13, 14, 15, …, 80+} are interacted in 
column 1 with the inverse of the country of origin size, in column 2 with the three quantiles 
of civil conflict severity, and in column 3 with the three quantiles of mass killings severity. 
Regarding the three quantiles of severity of civil conflict, for an average area in the sample, 
low severity corresponds to less than 899 casualties by country-year, medium severity to up to 
6,059 casualties, and high severity to more than 6,059 casualties. Regarding the quantiles of 
severity of mass killing episodes, the first quantile ranges from 0 to 32,000 deaths, the second 
quantile goes up to 128,000 deaths, and the third quantile the remainder. Abbreviations CC and 
MK refer respectively to civil conflict and mass killing.
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Table 16—Duration of Exposure: Cohorts Exposed during Childhood
Dependent variable: Violent crime propensity
 
Exposure to:
CC 
and MK
CC 
and MK
CC 
and MK
CC 
and MK
 
CC
 
CC
 
MK
 
MK
nb. years of exposure: ≤12 ≤12 All All All All All Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 kid [1–12] 0.751 1.085 1.209 0.629
(0.518) (0.632) (0.644) (0.729)
nb. years of exposure 0.186 0.116 0.194 0.163 0.180 0.148 0.286 0.252
(0.080) (0.087) (0.070) (0.061) (0.072) (0.063) (0.122) (0.135)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nationality × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,564 12,564 12,564 12,564 12,514 12,514 5,737 5,737
R2 0.200 0.200 0.201 0.202 0.200 0.201 0.197 0.197
Sample mean 
 (crime propensity)
3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.11 3.11 2.59 2.59
Notes: OLS estimations based on the sample of adult male cohorts of asylum seekers. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the nationality levels. The dependent variable stands for the violent crime propensity of a cohort of 
nationality (n) × age (a) × year (t).  kid  [1–12] is a binary measure of childhood exposure to civil conflict or mass 
killing (columns  1 to  4 ), to civil conflict only (columns  5 to  6 ), or to mass killing only (columns  7 to  8 ). nb. years 
of exposure is a continuous variable counting the number of years of exposure to civil conflict or mass killing (col-
umns  1 to  4 ), to civil conflict only (columns  5 to  6 ), or to mass killing only (columns  7 to  8 ). In columns 1 and 2, nb. 
years of exposure ranges up to 12 years to match the childhood definition of 1 to 12 years of age used for  kid [1–12]. 
In columns 1 to 4, the sample is restricted to cohorts originating from countries that have experienced civil con-
flict or mass killing since 1946, in columns 5 to 6 civil conflict only and in columns 7 to 8 mass killing episodes 
only. All estimations include age fixed effects, nationality × year fixed effects, and a set of binary variables coding 
for past exposure, but at the later ages  k ∈ {13, 14, 15, …, 80+} . Therefore, the reference group consists of those 
individuals born after the last years of violence. Abbreviations CC and MK refer respectively to civil conflict and 
mass killing.
Table 17—Controlling for Country of Origin Covariates during Childhood ([1–12])
Dependent variable: Violent crime propensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 kid [1–12] 0.925 0.942 0.837 0.878 0.506 0.574 0.462 0.722
(0.454) (0.452) (0.378) (0.389) (0.386) (0.389) (0.444) (0.487)
% primary education rate [1–12] 0.058 0.104
(0.043) (0.064)
polity iv [1–12] 0.043 0.065
(0.060) (0.073)
gdp/cap [1–12] 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nationality × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,799 8,799 10,870 10,870 9,003 9,003 7,065 7,065
R2 0.223 0.222 0.235 0.235 0.254 0.253 0.250 0.246
Sample mean (crime propensity) 3.03 3.03 3.19 3.19 3.07 3.07 3.03 3.03
Notes: OLS estimations based on the sample of adult male cohorts of asylum seekers originating from countries 
that have experienced civil conflict or mass killing since 1946. Robust standard errors are clustered at the nationality 
level. The dependent variable stands for the violent crime propensity of a cohort of nationality (n) × age (a) × year 
(t).  kid [1–12] is a binary measure of childhood exposure to civil conflict or mass killing. All estimations include age 
fixed effects, nationality  × year fixed effects and a set of binary variables coding for past exposure, but at the later 
ages  k ∈ {13, 14, 15, …, 80+} . Therefore, the reference group of consists of those individuals born after the last 
years of violence. The measure of democracy polity iv comes from the Polity IV index (2017); gdp/cap is the real 
GDP per capita at constant prices, from the Penn World Table (2018), and the % primary education rate is obtained 
from the variable % primary education rate for men aged more than 15 from Barro and Lee (2013) for a given year 
and nationality by shifting the year back by 15 years.
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